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This research work has been carried out for fulfilling requirement of my
Master’s Degree on Network and System Administration at University of
Oslo. The thesis is accomplished in four months time. The platform for the
thesis is provided by Norwegian Research Center and is conducted as a part
of ASSET project that has been launched by Norwegian Research Center.
Every infrastructure needed are provided by the Norwegian Research Center.
The study is on security system present for the WBAN technology
deployment in relation to e-health system. Any compromise in information
security in e-health might be paid by a patient life. An attempt is made to
figure out what are the security threats in the WBAN and what detection
and prevention tools do we have.
Setting up platform for conducing experiments is one of the important
aspect of this work. Experiments are carried on a simulator and real
hardware. DoS attack is one of the simplest but most devastating attacks in
e-health system. There exits other forms of attack as well that are equally
fatal. Ironically, we have very limited security system to mitigate those
attacks.
This thesis might be helpful for those who think of implementing the
WBAN technology like ZigBee application. It might pave a solid ground
for the students and security professionals who think of working with
security system in hot and new technology like the WBAN. For rest who
are interested in security system, might find it interesting to know current
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Abstract
With the advent of sophisticated technology and associated indubitable
benefits, the wireless network is gaining popularity day by day. Still
there exists numerous security challenges and to overcome these, different
researches are being carried on. This suggests that the wireless security
is still in nascent stage and requires further development. The new
wireless technologies like Wireless Body Area Network, thus provides tough
challenges to security professionals. Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN)
technology has been center of attraction in e-health system. In this
system, data security breach might even cost lives of patients, so it alarms
the need for highly reliable security system. This thesis is pivoted on
security vulnerabilities in Wireless Body Area Network and mitigation
tools and techniques to get rid of them. The study corresponds with
security concern of Adaptive Security for Smart Internet of Things in e-
Health (ASSET)project that has been launched by Norwegian Research
Center. The thesis enlightens ASSET with different types of security
threats that exist in wireless network, specifically on WBAN. It provides
ASSET an infrastructure setup to facilitate security analysis in its network
environment. ZigBee network, an instance of the WBAN is deployed as
experimental platform. Experiments are performed in the OPNET network
simulator and ASSET laboratory, consisting of different types of sensor
devices. The study shows DoS attack and message replay attack are easily
accomplished and prevalent in WBAN. However, security system to prevent
them are under development. Finally, the thesis provides ASSET a platform
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This thesis is carried out as a part of the project: Adaptive Security
for Smart Internet of Things in e-Health (ASSET). The project has been
launched by Norwegian Research Center. It is primarily focused on the risk-
based adaptive security for Internet-of-Things (IoT) in realm of e-health
system. The research is founded on Game Theory and Context-Awareness
with view of boosting up the security level [5]. This security concern of the
ASSET in e-health system is the ground of this study.
Recently, the deployment of e-health system has been attracted towards
Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) technology. The primary reasons
behind inclination are: lower power consumption by WBAN devices and
low implementation cost [6]. Despite the demand for WBAN is rapidly
increasing, the security system developed for WBAN is still in embryonic
stage. However, different security critical data communication has been
deployed in this type of network. One of such critical deployments is data
communication in e-health system. Data that flow in e-health system are
so critical that any compromise on such data might be paid by lives of the
patients. This alarms for the need for reliable security system in WBAN
technology.
The security issues in wireless network, have been a topic for
investigation for the security professionals. The ever present randomity
and unpredictability of wireless network traffic are the primary obstacles
in developing a single common standard solution for the wireless security
breaches. Different wireless standards (802 family) have been developed
and revised to assure better reliability and security on wireless network.
Despite in-depth researches that have been carried out, the security threats
are still prevailing. This is because of the novel threats that are introduced
by the hackers and attackers on wireless network. Hackers and attackers
find comparatively easier path to intrude into the wireless network due to
its easy accessibility feature.
The study discusses on different types of wireless attacks that an intruder
might come up with. The primary focus is paid on Wireless Body Area
Network security issues. Daniel-of-Service (DoS) attack is the most common
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attack in any wireless network. Thus, experiments are focused on different
types of DoS attacks in the WBAN. Sniffing, capturing network traffic and
replay attack are other considerations of this research. Experiments are
performed on two platforms. In the ASSET laboratory, tests are carried out
in a ZigBee network, one of the demanding implementations of the WBAN
standard. Sniffing, packet capture, replay attack and selective DoS attacks
are experimented in the real hardware. Jammer DoS attack and misbehaving
node DoS attack are analyzed through a simulator named: OPNET Modeler
Wireless Suite version 17.5.
The research finds out that DoS attacks can easily be created on 802.15.4
or ZigBee network. Similarly, sniffing, packet capture and replay attack
are also possible. However, it requires special hardware and firmwares
to accomplish these attacks. The study provides knowledge about these
different hardware devices that assist in creating attack scenarios. In
addition, it delivers idea about different sensor devices and related firmwares
that can be deployed to analyze 802.15.4 traffic. Details on creation of
attacks and results with the analysis are presented in the following chapters.
Initially, the objective of this research was to analyze the different
adaptive intrusion detection and prevention system developed for WBAN
technology. Unfortunately, no such tools are found developed for WBAN
network. Attempts were made to deploy some of the wireless security tools
developed for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) technology, but could
not produce the result due to some circumstances. These circumstances are
discussed in Discussion Chapter along with limitation of this research.
1.2 Problem Statement
Security in data communication in e-health system cannot be
compromised or else it may lead to severe adverse effect, like
death of the patients. The reasons behind such effects can
be: modified critical data about blood pressure, heart bits etc.
and unavailability of timely data. Ironically, the security tools
development are in nascent stage.
1.3 Objective and Significance
Resolving the issues mentioned below are the objective and significance of
this research.
1. the WBAN has emerged as new wireless technology, where the data
security is even more crucial. Thus, what can be the likely security
breaches in the WBAN in relation to e-health service and how can
they be detected and avoided?
2. A handful of Wireless Intrusion Detection and Prevention System do
exist til date. All of them are developed for WLAN standard. Can
these tools operate in the WBAN sensor network? If so, what is the
best available tool for the WBAN standard when it involves e-health
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security issues? If not, what further enhancement these tools must
be embedded with, to assure their deployment; in the realm of the
WBAN e-health service?
1.4 Structure of Study
The study has been discussed under six chapters. The first chapter,
Introduction, provides scope, significance and quick overview of important
aspects of the research. The second chapter, Background and Literature,
discusses on related work carried out previously and theoretical base that
are necessary to formulate ground for experiments and analysis. In the third
chapter, Approach, preliminary plans and procedures to resolve problem
statements and meet the objective of the study, are mentioned. The
fourth chapter, Result and Analysis, presents the ways the experiments are
conducted, results obtained and analysis of the results. The fifth chapter,
Discussion, enlightens about the findings and significance of the research.
It also addresses about shortcomings and complications encountered and
shares the knowledge and lesson gained from this thesis work. Finally, in the
sixth chapter, Conclusion, important portions of the study are summarized





This portion of the report discusses on related background theories
in wireless network. The background theory starts with related work
accomplished previously. Then, it continues further with highlighting on
security issues in wireless network and different wireless standards we
have. WLAN and Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) are discussed
in more details, with respective standards, security features and security
flaws encompassed by them. The section also provides short overview of the
popular wireless network simulators. At the end, the background theory
discusses on different intrusion detection mechanisms and tools, focusing on
real time adaptive features.
2.1 Related Work
This chapter presents the different relevant researches or experiments carried
on security vulnerabilities in the WBAN or 802.15.4 network. The chapter
also includes some relevant researches conducted on security tools developed
or proposed in order to combat the security threats in the WBAN network.
Security Exploitation in WBAN
Sang Shin Jung in his Master’s Thesis [7] demonstrated the different
possibilities to attack wireless sensor network. He presented how beacon-
enabled 802.15.4 network is open to availability and integrity breaches. In
his experiment, he implemented Tmote Sky motes devices as sensor nodes
in beacon-enabled mode. The network consisted of a Private Area Network
(PAN co-coordinator) and other three nodes. These end devices used to
send temperature and humidity related data to the Coordinator. Among
the three end nodes, a node was configured to function as malicious node.
He has demonstrated how synchronization attack degrades the throughput of
PAN coordinator. Secondly, Jung talked about DoS attack. Jung presented
how Guaranteed Time Slot (GTS) deallocation request from the malicious
node consumes the network resource, lowering throughput of other end
nodes. Next, he performed impersonation attack through eliminating GTS
descriptor from malicious attack. The other nodes that waited for their
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GTS, kept on waiting and waiting. This was mentioned about another DoS
attack. In false data injection attack, he exhibited that misbehaving nodes
injecting false data in the network in the name of other nodes. Further,
Jung presented the two other forms of DoS attack through GTS request
packet. In addition Jung talked about different pitfalls those exist on
802.15.4 network. He then recommends the possible preventive mechanisms
to control mentioned attack. Mostly they were focused on authentication of
GTS request through unicast authentication procedure.
Joshua Wright [8] has developed a open source firmware named KillerBee
based on python language. The tool is used to generate different attacks on
802.15.4 network, precisely in ZigBee network. In his video presentation,
he demonstrated how KillberBee configured specific device could generate
different attacks in the ZigBee network. Message sniffing and then making
replay attacks were the primary concerns. The implementation of KillerBee
is confined within particular sensor device named Atmel AVR RAVEN
or RZUSBSTICK [9] used in ZigBee network. Other sensor devices like
Telosb Tmote Sky can also be configured with KillerBee but for the full
functionality may not be supported. The KillerBee tool is found deployed
in many other researches as a packet sniffer.
Several other researches are found carried on security vulnerabilities on
802.15.4 network. An article on Jamming the 802.15.4 network [10], by a
group of students at Virginia University demonstrated their research and
presented different ways of jamming the 802.15.4 network. They proposed
different techniques on combating the different jamming attack if the attacks
are being conducted by the devices similar to the devices in use. They
implemented a network of MICAz mote devices in their work. Colin P.
O’Flynn has also published an article [11] on jamming attacks on 802.15.4
network. He conducted his experiments on specific transceiver named Atmel
AT86RF231. Colin has discussed on different ways of jamming ranging from
selective channel jamming to whole network jamming. He also discussed
on message specific jamming and presented the possibility of interfering to
particular data flow in the network.
2.1.1 Simulation Work
Wireless sensor networks require different specific devices to conduct
experiment on them. Thus, often the concentration is found paid on
simulators. The OPNET simulator is widely used to simulate wireless sensor
network. Jesus Manuel Gonzalez de Jesus had conducted his Master’s Thesis
on jamming attacks through implementation of OPNET 12.0 modulator
[12]. The jamming attack study was made on 802.11 network. Through
simulation he presented the different types of jamming attack on 802.11
network. He discusses on the four types of jammers those are present in
the wireless communication, namely constant jammer, deceptive jammer,
random jammer and reactive jammer. His thesis work was more pointed at
implementing Opnet Modeler simulation tool to simulate jamming attacks.
Doddapaneni Krishna Chaitanya and Arindham Ghosh from Middlesex
University performed the similar DoS attack tests in The OPNET simulator
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16 [13]. They had designed a ZigBee network with ten sensor nodes, a
ZigBee router and a ZigBee coordinator. Their simulation experiments were
based on the parameters internal arrival time and packet size. Through
alteration on those parameters on one or more sensor nodes, they presented
how the throughput and volume of traffic sent in the network affected. As
an conclusion, they drew that coordinator node was more sensitive to DoS
attack than router node.
2.1.2 WBAN Security Tools
A number of researches and tests are conducted in designing the intrusion
detection system for the WBAN. However, most of the researches are still
confined to propose the models but no specific tools have been developed.
The security systems lack specific tools that can be applied to detecting
intrusion detection system in the WBAN. A group of five students Gjovanni
Vigna, Sumit Gwalani, Kavitha Srinivasan, Elizabeth M. Belding-Royer and
Richard A. Kemmerer, at University of California had designed intrusion
detection tool for AODV protocol based ad hoc wireless network [14].
The tool developed by them could spoof the MAC address modifying the
sequence number. The tool could also track the packets dropped by the
intermediate misbehaving node, preventing the packets reaching to the
final destination. Packet drops could of be different types based on the
types of control data being sent. Their tool could also figure out the
events of resource depletion attack in the network. According to them,
resource depletion could be made possible by transmitting voluminous
control packets. The tool could detect such attack as well. However, the
tool developed by them was not brought into practice.
2.2 Wireless Standards
Depending upon the requirements, computer network is classified into
different categories. It ranges from it’s simple form of Private Area Network
(PAN) to sophisticated Wide Area Network (WAN). Local Area Network
and Metropolitan Area Network lie in between these two. Whether it
is simple network (PAN) or the sophisticated network (WAN), there is
provision of wireless data transmission. In PAN, wireless technologies are
deployed in the form infrared, bluetooth data or other radio waves from
simple APs. But on the other hand, complicated satellite technologies are
implemented in WAN where radio signals can travel miles and miles cross
the countries. Figure 2.1 represents the different wireless standards intended
to meet different classes of network’s requirements. However, the focus will
be on WLAN and the WBAN standard discussed below.
2.3 Wireless Local Area Network
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) consists of communication devices
interacting with each other through wireless channels. This network came
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Figure 2.1: Global Wireless Standards
into existence so as to enhance the wired network with radio technology.
With radio technology, wireless network facilitates user mobility during data
connectivity and offers lowered cost over wired technology. For this reason,
the wireless network is gaining popularity day by day and has been used as
general-purpose connectivity in any business enterprises. WLAN provides
solutions for small home network, cellular network and corporate network.
Still, it is under continuous enhancement. The focuses are paid on quality of
service, better security efficiency, shorter handover and increased throughput
[15].
Despite the different advantages that the wireless network has over the
wired network, it has different shortcomings in comparison with the wired
network. Deterioration of power signal with distance to WLAN access
point and interference in the wireless signal generated by the other devices
operating on similar frequencies are the major drawbacks. Likewise, data
rate in most wireless network seems comparatively lower than the wired
network. “The wireless network lacks provision of transmitting and receiving
data through the same channel at the same time” [15]. Moreover, the
wireless network falls short of security assurance in contrast with the wired
network.
Security issues in wireless network have always been of core interest
in the field of computer network. The challenge is on providing efficient
security solutions while maintaining scalability. The fundamental concern of
WLAN security lies on authentication and authorization to secure network
resources, data encryption and user data integrity [15]. In broad sense,
authentication of users and access point, confidentiality, data integrity non-
repudiation of origin and delivery, auditing and logging, denial of service
prevention and traffic flow analysis prevention are the security concerns in a
WLAN. To assure the availability solutions to these security issues, WLAN
has defined different security levels and security framework components.
Still, it lacks analysis on overall framework that may deploy different
environments such as private, public and virtual network. Under such
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conditions, the WLAN is expected to be embedded with possibility of
roaming between such networks.
Out of seven layers of OSI module, in WLAN; security issues are dealt
in layer two (Data-link Layer) and layer three (Network Layer) networks.
At layer two, wired equivalent protection (WEP) is implemented. WEP
is one of the security protocols based on wireless standard 802.11. It is
supposed to assure that secured WLAN is as protected as wired network.
Several such protocols have been developed for various WLAN technologies.
Details on these protocols will be discussed later in this report. Likewise,
the layer three security is supposed to facilitate user authentication, secure
IP mobility and roaming among different domains. The security policies
in WLAN can be implemented through host security, data driven attack
prevention and organizational security policies [15].
2.3.1 WLAN Standards
In order to maintain compatible communication protocol among various
networking devices in wireless network, IEEE has developed a common
wireless standards for WLAN. The standard is known by 802.11 standard.
The earlier version had security and limited bandwidth problems. Therefore;
the standard has been revised and improved to accommodate the various
bandwidth requirements of various users and enhance security. Common
improved versions are 802.11b, 802.11a, 802.11g and 802.11n. However,
some versions of wireless standards are not backward compatible with earlier
versions. 802.11b is the earliest version of 802.11 WLAN standard. The
latest version of the WLAN standard is 802.11n which can operate at 600
Mbps. 802.11a is not compatible with 802.11b while the other versions
are compatible with 802.11b [4]. Recently, Wi.Fi (Wireless Fidelity) has
established itself as de-facto standard for wireless communication in WLAN.
Wi-Fi can provide service equivalent to wired service in terms of bandwidth.
It operates in around 54 Mbps. In addition, Wi-Fi operates in ISM (Industry,
Scientific and Medical) band and other user band which need not any license
to use [16]. For these reasons, Wi-Fi has been widely deployed in WLAN.
Table 2.1 provides the overview of different versions of wireless standard
with accompanying bandwidth and technology used behind.
Table 2.1: WLAN Standards [4]
IEEE Frequency/ Speed Topology Transmission Access
Standard Medium Range Method
802.11 2.4 GHz RF 1 to Adhoc/ 20 feet CSMA/CA
2 Mbps infrastructure indoors
802.11a 5 GHz upto Adhoc/ 20 to 75 CSMA/CA
54 Mbps infrastructure feet indoors
802.11b 2.4 GHz upto Adhoc/ upto 150 CSMA/CA
11 Mbps infrastructure feet indoors
802.11g 2.4 GHz upto Adhoc/ upto 150 CSMA/CA
54 Mbps infrastructure feet indoors
802.11n 2.4 GHz/ upto Adhoc/ 175+ CSMA/CA
5 GHz 600 Mbps infrastructure feet indoors
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2.3.2 WLAN Security
802.11 wireless standard has provided WLAN with benefits like mobility and
productivity. Unfortunately, the wireless standard has several pitfalls. The
wireless network has been playground for hackers and attackers. However,
it does not mean that there exists no remedy to counteract such mischievous
activities. One can mitigate the attacks and hacks in wireless network if the
proper deployment of physical devices and security policies are implemented.
Figure 2.2 shows different components of a wireless network with possible
attack areas among them. And the following five ideas and techniques are
found deployed to get rid of wireless-specific attack [17]:
Figure 2.2: Elements of Wireless Network with possible Attack Areas [1]
1. Discovery and Mitigation of Rogue APs and Vulnerabilities:
One of the primary reasons for wireless security pitfalls is allowing
open connection to the wireless network. Such wireless networks are
termed as rogue WLANs. Rogue WLANs can therefore be access
points, laptops deployed as access points, user stations, barcode
scanners and printers. The rogue access points and even the wireless
laptops are supposed to configure with at least basic wireless security
standards. The improperly configured WLANS can originate network
vulnerabilities. Improper configuration includes deploying wireless
network in an area where there is already another wireless network.
There is possibility to access wireless network by people in another
wireless network under if the APs are misconfigured. Therefore,
the position of the access point should be marked to avoid collision
with neighboring network. The rogue access points and some other
vulnerabilities can be detected through freeware like NetStumber and
Kismet. Since, the rogue access point and /or WLAN may get created
any time, it requires periodic checking through such freeware. For best
results, constant monitoring almost everyday is to be performed. It
helps in obtaining the precise information about hacks and attacks.
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Separate set of wireless intrusion detection sensors can be effective
wireless security technique to mitigate attacks in wireless network.
2. Lock Down all Access Points and Devices: This security
technique involves configuring the APs and wireless stations like
laptops so as to control the unwanted connections. The user stations
should be installed with software that ensures that security policies are
being deployed. The software should alert the users in case any security
breaches are made. Likewise, enterprise-class access points are to be
considered to enhance the wireless security. The enterprise-class access
points are embedded with advance security policies. The common
mistake that paves easy path for intruders is selecting the default
Service Set Identifier (SSID). SSID is the name of the AP. The default
SSID names are predictable. Therefore, the network administrators
should change the SSID name with something unpredictable names.
This makes tough for the intruders to coin the name of the SSID,
preventing them to recognize the APs. More security can be achieved
if the broadcasting mode of SSID is disabled. Thus, the network
users need to know the SSID before making connection requests. The
enterprise-class APs has feature of filtering connections based on MAC
address. Likewise, a policy with disabling the slower connection,
disables the connection attempt from outside of the targeted WLAN
periphery.
3. Encryption and Authentication: Encryption and authentication
are key elements for wireless security. However, there exist no
completely reliable encryption and authentication techniques. Just
one can do is to select the most efficient tools and secure the
WLAN as far as possible. The 802.11 standard based protocols,
especially WEP has been proved unsecured as encrypted traffic can
be easily decrypted. Even the hackers have created tools that decrypt
the traffic encrypted by the WEP protocol. Therefore, security
conscious network administrators are focusing on VPN for enhanced
encryption and authentication between APs and the network clients.
Likewise, radius server has been considered for securely managing
authentication, accounting and access to the network resources.
4. Set and Force WLAN Policies: The security policies requirements
in WLANs may vary from enterprise to enterprise. Each enterprise
defines its own set of security policies based on their needs and
concerns. Whatever are the needs, the security policies should prevent
from unauthorized access to the access points at first. Access points
are where WEP or VPN connections are implemented. Similarly, SSID
is also associated with access point. Therefore, proper security policies
should be developed for access points. Also, reconfiguration of access
points and WLAN cards should be restricted to prevent from making
changes to predefined configurations in APs.
Another security policy generally implemented in securing WLAN is
setting channel speed and connection time. Normally, the connection
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speed of the channel is set up to be 5.5 Mb/s or 11 Mb/s. Any
connection not following the prescribed channel speed, are considered
as malicious connection and thus terminated. To ensure that the
intruders not try to connect during the office off hours, time policy can
be made. Any connection attempts other than during the stated time
in the security policy, are again considered as malicious connection
attempts and thus terminated, regardless of users even they are the
office staffs. The policy enforcement is equally important as the
policy itself. In addition, the policies should monitor the security
vulnerabilities as much as possible. The most effective would be
monitoring every moment as far as possible.
5. Intrusion Detection and Prevention: Proper intrusion detection
and prevention system tools can contribute in security system in
wireless network effectively and efficiently. Intrusion prevention
system (IDS) restricts the malicious traffic from reaching the internal
network or at least sensitive area of the network. Intrusion detection
and prevention system are supposed to monitor every traffic coming
inside the network and assure that they are totally harmless. Every
day hackers are trying with new approaches of hacking and attacking
the WLAN. Hence, security policies should be well defined in IDS, and
should be adaptable to recognize the emerging threats in the WLAN.
2.3.3 Security Threats in Wireless Local Area Network
Wireless network has been targeted network for hackers and attackers. The
reason behind is ease of intrusion and availability of wide vulnerable areas in
wireless networks. Therefore, to assure security, developer and implementer
of WLAN should have idea about various possible threats that are likely to
be encountered in the WLAN. Previously, wireless devices were costly and
thus attacks were minimum but today, most devices have wireless service
therefore, attacks in WLAN have significantly burst up. The following
attacks are common on wireless networks [15]:
Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service Attack (DoS Attack) floods the traffic in networks
preventing the legitimate users accessing the network resources. DoS attacks
can even be unintended but may have severe effects, particularly for low
capacity data flow network. The DoS attack differs between wired and
wireless network only at network, data-link and physical layer. At network
layer level, DoS attack is common as IEEE 802.11 wireless standard is a
shared medium. Thus, malicious users can find an easy path to flood the
network. Such simple and common DoS attack can be flooding the gateway
with Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) message. 802.11b easily
gets saturated, thus it is prone to DoS attack.
In data-link layer, the same easy access to the medium makes it easy
for attackers to come up with DoS Attack. Despite the WEP security, the
intruders can access the link layer information. With no WEP security
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implemented, the client is always open to DoS attacks from the spoofed
APs. At physical layer, the attacker can create the similar frequency bands
as used by 802.11 wireless standard. Thus, they can easily saturate the
channels with introducing noises. There exists many devices that generate
the signals operate at 2.4 GHz. These devices can easily make WLAN down.
For examples, cordless devices use the same frequency as that of 802.11b and
Bluetooth devices use the frequency band as used by 802.11b and 802.11g.
Thus, it paves easy path for the attackers to produce interference in the
wireless channels; curbing users of the network unable to access the desired
data.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack
Two forms of Man in the Middle Attacks are found in WLAN, eavesdropping
and manipulation. Eavesdropping is simply recording and analyzing the
traffic flowing in the network while manipulation means accessing the traffic,
making changes and re-transmitting the altered data back to network.
1. Eavesdropping: Since the radio signals are omnipresent inside the
specific range, there is every possibility for an attacker to access and
even store the traffic flowing in the wireless network. Although,
the transmission of signals are supposed to deteriorate after certain
distance, with efficient wireless antenna, one can access the wireless
signals over much longer distance, even from miles away. The only
way to prevent useful network information from eavesdropping is the
deployment of efficient encryption techniques. So; the developers
of WLAN have introduced WEP security. But, WEP in itself has
many flaws. Thus, it cannot prevent network information from
eavesdropping. This seeks more security policies implementation
requirements at higher levels. They can be IPsec, SSH or SSL (Secured
Socket Layer) security policies. Another idea behind preventing
eavesdropping is to stop unauthorized access of the network traffic from
the third parties. Noureddine [15] suggests the following techniques to
tackle with eavesdropping:
a. the antenna positioning and shielding use
b. the control of the use of a particular antenna, when the device
supports antenna diversity
c. the control of transmitted signal strength
d. the use of directional antennas and use of shielding points
2. Manipulation: Manipulation is the further further extended violence
of eavesdropping. The attacker who assesses the network traffic can
alter the network traffic and resend the changed traffic. The attackers
can introduce rogue AP in the wireless network. It is a spoofed
Wireless Access Point (AP). As wireless devices are made to join the
most powerful APs, the victim may join such rogue APs, whereby
the attackers can record the victims data, analyze them, alter them
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with wrong data or even block the data flowing to the victims. Under
no security policies or low level of security policies, the attackers can
easily determine the SSID associated with the wireless network and
can make easy entry in such network. WEP is supposed to obscure
such unwanted intrusion from third parties. But, as it is found not
less effective, the manipulation can be controlled with authentication,
authorization and accounting of the users connecting to the wireless
network.
Message Modification and Injection
It has been proved that traffic encrypted by WEP can be altered in the
during transmission. The attackers involved here takes advantage of linearity
function used by the WEP checksum. The attackers can alter the original
message without altering the checksum and without accessing the traffic
physically. They can just alter data mid-way. The task needed for the
attackers is to maintain the same checksum before and after such alterations.
Since checksum is the unkeyed function of messages and WEP does not
prevent secure access control, the adversary can compute the checksums
after having knowledge of the message. As the attacker can get familiarized
with the entire messages of any transmitted frame, he can inject some
arbitrary data without bringing changes in the checksum of the frame.
Message Decryption
As the attackers can manipulate the encrypted traffic without detection in
WLANs, they can even decrypt the traffics flowing. For this purpose, the
attackers can target on APs. They can misuse the AP address and decrypt
the cipher text in the following two ways:
1. IP Redirection: IP redirection is to sniff the encrypted packets and
then spoof IP address of the APs that is changing the destination
IP address of the packets being delivered in the WLAN. However, it
requires the APs to function as router for internet connectivity in the
network. WEP is all about granting permission to access the WLAN.
Thus, WEP opens path for accessing the APs. The APs can then be
directed to decrypt the traffic and alter the destination address. This
leads the traffic to flow from the WLAN to the attackers residing in the
internet network. The challenge for the attackers here are to coin out
the destination IP address and assuring the checksum of the traffic is
still the same after altering the destination address. The formal task
is relatively straight-forward. It is easy to find out the IP address
of the subnet being used by the WLAN. With decryption of such
traffic flowing to such network, one can find out the IP address of the
other side taking part in communication. Thus, one can find out the
destination IP address and thus makes it possible to change it. But,
attackers need to come up with more efforts maintaining the checksum.
If the checksum is previously known, attackers just need some simple
XORing the previous and new checksum and find the value for the
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value of the IP to be changed to maintain the same checksum. But if
the checksum is not exposed in advance, the attackers require going
with hit and trial method for finding checksum.
2. Reaction Attack: In any TCP/IP traffic, the recipient confirms the
validity of the incoming packet with acknowledgement in response
if the packet passes checksum check. And WEP might be used
to secure TCP/IP traffic. Under these two conditions, attackers
can make reaction attacks. Thus, the reaction attack is based on
acknowledgement packet sent by the receivers. The acknowledgement
packets can simply be tracked, as these packets are relatively smaller
avoiding the need of decryption. The attackers start with flipping few
bits in the cipher-text adjusting the encrypted CRC accordingly to
get a new cipher-text. Then, the packet is injected in the network
to see if it passes the checksum or not that is if it responds with
acknowledgment or not. The presence or the absence of the TCP
acknowledgment, provides a bit information of the packet. The
attackers continues altering the position of the flipped bits and
eventually, the whole packet information can be retrieved.
2.3.4 Wireless Security Protocols
The earlier thinking behind the development of wireless network was to
provide the end users with easy access to the network. The developers came
up with their objectives behind. But, with the provision of easy access to
such wireless network, the inherent threats also came into existence and
adverse effect went on boosting because of unwanted accesses. To combat
such unwanted accesses and the possible threats; the developers of wireless
security have introduced several security protocols. The basic idea behind
such security protocols is found to meet the wire equivalent security in the
wireless network. Even the first security protocols developed for wireless
network is Wire Equivalent Privacy (WEP). Other security protocols are
Wifi Protected Access (WPA) and Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP).
Nowadays, these wireless security protocols are embedded with wireless
devices like routers and other access points. Details on these wireless security
protocols are discussed below.
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP)
WEP is first wireless security protocol that came into existence to control
wireless threats [18, 19]. The idea behind was to facilitate the wireless
network with wired level security. The task is completed via encryption
technique through RC4 algorithm at both sender side and receiver side
during the data communication [20]. RC4 is the most popular stream cipher
in the world of cryptography that provides a pseudo random stream of bits.
RC4 prevents from the hackers attempt to [18, 21, 19]. WEP implements
the combination of secret key and encryption to secure traffic. The secret
key consists of a simple password of either 5 characters or 8 characters [18].
This secret key is of 40 bits with 24 Initialization Vector (IV). Without the
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IV, the security key would generate the same cipher-text. Thus, with use
of IV, each time different cipher-text is generated. This prevents attackers
from eavesdropping the data pattern [20]. The augmented key acts as both
encryption and decryption keys [20].
At the sender side, the user data (plain-text) is passed through Integrity
Check (IC) and the checksum is calculated. This checksum is appended with
the user data through exclusive-or (XOR) function [20]. The concatenated
stream is then encrypted with the shared key through RC4 algorithm. Such
encrypted data are the final data to be transmitted in the network along
with IV. At the receiver end, at first, the secret key is generated from shared
key and IV provided along with cipher text. This secret key decrypts the
cipher text and produces plaint text and IC checksum. The plaint text again
goes through IC and generates new IC checksum. Finally, the old and the
new IC checksums are compared to assure the data integrity
WEP Security Weaknesses With references to the articles “A Survey
on Wireless Security Protocols (WEP, WPA and WPA2(802.11i)” [20] and
“Choosing the Right Wireless LAN Security Protocol for the Home and
Business User” [20], the following security problems are associated with
WEP protocol.
• WEP is unable to control packet forgery and replay attacks.
• WEP uses RC4 algorithm, which has flaws in itself, and further the
algorithm is improperly utilized. The secret keys considered are weak
enough so that they can be easily brute-forced with open software.
• WEP encrypted cipher-text that can easily be decrypted without
having the need to know the security keys. Even no smooth updates
are available for security keys.
Wifi Protected Access (WPA)
WPA came into existence so as to overcome the shortcomings of the WEP
cryptography protocol. WPA has two operation modes [20]:
• Personal WPA or WPA-PSK (Pre-Shared Key): This type
of cryptography method is intended for home or small business
organization. The protocol does not use authentication server. The
cryptography key implemented can be alphanumeric and range up to
256 bits. This key is prevented from transferring in the network. Both
the AP and station are provided with such cryptography key. In this
way, WPA facilitates the mutual authentication. The WPA key is
deployed only initiate initial session with APs.
• Enterprise WPA or Commercial WPA or WPA-TKIP:
Enterprise WPA implements 802.1X+EAP during authentication
procedure. 802.1X+EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) is an
authentication protocol developed for IEEE 802 (wireless) networks.
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It assists in transferring authentication messages between wireless
users and authentication server, thereby, eliminating the burden of
authentication task from APs. Likewise, WPA-TKIP implements
more advanced TKIP encryption. The enhanced protocol obviates
the use of preshared key during authentication. But, it requires
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server for
authentication mechanism [18, 20, 22].
• Wifi Protected Access 2 (WPA2): WPA2 implements the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) for security purpose. AES is
the government standard security [22]. It is operable in both personal
and enterprise level and has been found most effective in to combat
entry of intrusions in the wireless network [18, 20, 22].
2.4 Wireless Body Area Network
Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) often referred to as WPAN; is a
network of sensor nodes are configured on or inside the human body. The
data collected by these sensors are retrieved by personal devices like PDAs,
smart-phones, tablets etc [23]. The WBAN has evolved as the possible
solution to technical challenge associated with real-time health monitoring
system. In health sector, the technology has been used to alert both doctors
and patients about the health problems or progress of the patient in real-
time. Besides, the WBAN technology is also deployed in non-medical sector
like sports, video streaming, date file transfer and so on [24]. IEEE Task
Group 6 (TG) have developed the wireless standard 802.15.6 for the WBAN.
The concentration has been made on lower power consumption device. This
is because these devices are intended for transferring the critical medical
data to remote receivers. The devices should operate for longer time,
consuming significantly lower power [24, 6, 25, 26, 27, 23, 28]. Through the
implementation of body sensors, the pervasive technology can be deployed
in the WBAN to accomplish the task of remote medical services in health
sector [27]. Figure 2.3 depicts the simple deployment of the WBAN along
with constituent equipment those are implemented in the WBAN.
2.4.1 WBAN Security Issues
Since the nodes in the WBAN are intended to transfer vital and critical
patient data, various concerns are emerged during the technology design.
Bandwidth selection, channel modeling, MAC protocol design, energy-
efficient hardware, reliability and availability, security and privacy are some
of the important issues which are considered during technology design [24].
The security issues in the WBAN are summarized below [24]:
• Data Confidentiality: As the nodes in the WBAN have their role
in transferring the critical patient data, the WBAN should be able
to hold data confidentiality. Patients data should be prevented from
disclosing among non-concerned people or network.
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Figure 2.3: Simple deployment of the WBAN network with it’s network
components
• Data Integrity: Data integrity bears no meaning unless data are
prevented from alterations. Since in the wireless network, data
alteration in the mid way by intruders has become common attack,
data integrity should be effectively handled in the WBAN. The data
integrity often occurs as a result of data loss during transmission.
Thus, even the physical channels are supposed to absolutely reliable.
• Data Authentication: Often the intruders may come up with
fabricated data in the WBAN. Under this condition, the WBAN
should be facilitated with the ability to authenticate the original source
of the data.
• Secure Localization: Sometimes, finding out the exact location of
the patients become very important to prevent unwanted accidents.
Nevertheless there is every possibility that intruders may alter the
location of the patient. Thus, the WBAN implementation should also
consider this issue.
• Availability: As previously mentioned, devices in the WBAN are
supposed to be up for ever or at least efficient back-up devices should
be deployed. However, due to easy availability nature of wireless
network, the intruder might be able to obstruct the operation of the
nodes. Interruption in transmission of critical data are absolutely
undesirable in the such network.
The security issues discussed above are summarized and presented in
Table 2.2 with possible solutions:
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Table 2.2: Summary of security issues in the WBAN with possible solutions
Security Issues Threats Possible Solutions
Data confidentiality Message disclosure Link/Network Layer
encryption, access control
Data integrity Message Modification Keyed secure hash function,
digital signature
Data authentication Unauthenticated/ Random key distribution
unauthorized access public key cryptography
Secure localization False patient Smart tracking
location
Availability DoS attacks Intrusion detection,
redundancy
2.4.2 Threats in WBAN
Still the WBAN technology is in the nascent stage. It requires lots of further
research for assuring higher degree of reliability and are being conducted too.
There exists several security challenges in the WBAN as the standard is quite
different from the existing wireless standards. Further, data traffic under
consideration in the WBAN is comparatively critical than other wireless
networks [23]. One of the major challenges for the WBAN is undeterred
availability of network devices and channels. To achieve such availability of
network resources, DoS attacks should be completely eliminated from the
network. The threats in the WBAN can generalized as privacy violation and
physical attack [24]. In this thesis, different types of DoS attacks and their
possible solutions are presented on layered basis. Figure 2.4 below presents
quick overview of the DoS attacks with brief overview [24, 25]:
2.4.3 WBAN Security Model
In order to maintain the expected security in the WBAN, 802.15.4 has
defined three levels of security [28]. With increase in level numbers, the
security level also increases. The three security levels are presented below:
• Level 0: The level 0 provides no security at all. It is an unsecured
communication. There exists no provisions of data authentication and
integrity. Plus, it provides no confidentiality and privacy. Also, it is
unable to handle replay attacks.
• Level 1: This is the medium level of security that the standard
provides in the WBAN. It provides the facility of authentication prior
to data transfer, but it still lacks data encryption. This security level
also fails against confidentiality and replay attacks.
• Level 2: This is the most advance security level that the WBAN
standard has designed. The data communication takes place under
secured authentication and with encryption. This security level also
provides the solution to confidentiality need and replay attacks.
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Figure 2.4: Layered presentation of DoS security threats with preventive measures
2.5 ZigBee Network
ZigBee network extends the 802.15.4 standard to Network Layer of OSI
model that is ZigBee works on the top of 802.15.4 standard [29]. Precisely,
ZigBee enhances 802.15.4 standard providing Network Layer with security
and Application Layer [29, 30]. This enhancement provides ZigBee standard
broad application area. The standard has been deployed in different
automation process, telecom services, health care system, smart energy
system and lots more [29]. 802.15.4 is unable to support multi-hop
networking and mesh networking [31]. This shortcoming is eradicated by
ZigBee and can provide a single network platform to communicate more
than 64000 devices [29]. Figure 2.5 provides vision of layered architecture
of the ZigBee network. 802.15.4 operates at lower two layers denoted
by with pink block and ZigBee operates on the upper two layers as
denoted by yellow-green color. These devices can be connected in Mesh
Topology, Star Topology or Tree Topology [29, 30]. ZigBee is thus designed
to communicated largest number of devices through single platform [29].
20
Figure 2.6 represents a simple ZigBee network with different ZigBee network
components. ZigBee has two versions: ZigBee 2006 and ZigBee PRO [2].
ZigBee PRO is the advanced version of ZigBee 2006.
Figure 2.5: Layered presentation of ZigBee network [2]
• ZigBee Coordinator: Coordinator is the pivot of a ZigBee network.
It is responsible for managing and securing the network [29]. Single
Coordinator is enough to manage a ZigBee network. It provides
channel number and PAN id to other devices [31].
• ZigBee Router: Router serves as platform for communicating end
devices with the Coordinator. Routers in ZigBee network are optional,
but used it builds Neighbor Table as a database of Neighbor Routing
[31].
• ZigBee End Device: End Devices are also optional in ZigBee
Network [31]. The activities of these devices are primarily governed by
the Coordinator. End devices collect data that they sense and relay
to the Coordinator. These devices go to sleep mode when no data
communication take place to preserve energy [31].
Figure 2.6 shows a network formed by using a Coordinator, four Routers
and two End Devices.
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Figure 2.6: A simple ZigBee network with different components
Data communication in ZigBee network takes place in 27 channels
[29, 31]. These channels are divided for three different frequency bands
868 MHz, 915 MHz and 2.4 GHz [29, 32]. Table 2.3 provides the overview
of channels division based on frequency band.
Table 2.3: Distribution of channels in physical layer
Frequency Band Bit Rate Channels Geographical Area
868 MHz 20 kbps 1 Europe
915 MHz 40 kbps 10 EEUU
2.4 GHz 250 kbps 16 Worldwide
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2.5.1 Features
The following features are associated with ZigBee specification that places
it on the top of other sensor networks [2]:
• Lower power consumption
• Comparatively cheaper
• More reliable and faster
• Huge node network with easy deployment
• More secure with network layer security
• Globally deployable and inter-operable
2.5.2 ZigBee Network Management
In ZigBee network, devices can join the network through two procedures:
MAC Association and NWK rejoin [2]. The two methods are discussed
below.
MAC Association
MAC Association is mandatory procedure for joining a ZigBee network
[2]. Figure 2.7 provides a pictorial view of MAC Association. The device
(mainly Coordinator) that wants other device to participate in the network;
sends NLME-PERMIT-JOINING request. The joining devices discovers the
network to join based on the request command issued by the previous device.
The discovery of network is accomplished through Beacon request command.
The end devices then issue NLME-JOIN request with Association request
command. MAC Association technique to join network is completed with
Association response command. MAC addresses are recorded during MAC
Association request/response. MAC Association does not have any security
system. All the frames during MAC Association are transmitted in plain
text [2].
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Figure 2.7: Network joining procedure with MAC Association protocol [2]
NWK Rejoin
This is secure way of joining a ZigBee network [2]. Figure 2.8 provides a
vision of network joining procedures undertaken by NWK Rejoin protocol.
The communication is encrypted with NWK Key that is previously provided
by the Coordinator. If the device is joining for the first time, there should
be some provision of transferring NWK Key to joining devices [2]. With this
protocol, joining devices need not wait for NLME JOINING request from
upper device. They initiate network joining procedure by issuing NLME-
JOIN request via NWK Rejoin request command [2].
2.5.3 Security Techniques in ZigBee
ZigBee is developed as more secure the WBAN deployment than traditional
802.15.4 network. In addition to security system maintained by Physical
Layer and Data-link Layer of 802.15.4 network, it provides the security at
Network Layer and Transport Layer [29, 32, 2]. The extended security
system is grounded on 128-bit AES encryption [2]. The security system
in ZigBee is meant for securing key management, device management and
frame protection [2]. Security is organized in three layers viz, MAC Layer,
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Figure 2.8: Network joining procedure with NWK Rejoin protocol [2]
Network (NWK) Layer and Application (APS) Layer. Security system in




Trust center is usually a Coordinator, but it can be any other dedicated
device. Trust center manages network devices. It decides whether to permit
or deny the End Devices to join the network. It also updates the network
key periodically. The role of such trust center can be further divided into
three as [2]:
• Trust Manager: Authenticate End Devices willing to join network
• Network Manager: Manage network keys
• Configuration Manager: Assure end-to-end security among devices
Security Keys:
In order to maintain security, ZigBee implements three types of keys [2]:
• Master Keys: Master Keys are used to encrypt Link Keys establish-
ment procedure that are actually used for frame encryption. They can
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be Trust Center Master Keys generated by Trust Center or Application
Layer Master Keys.
• Network Keys: These keys encrypt the Network Layer communication
and there exist only one Network Key at a time for every End Devices.
• Link Keys: Link Keys encrypts only unicast messages flowing between
End Devices at Application Layer. It can be either Trust Center Link
Key or Application Link Key.
2.5.4 Security Mode
ZigBee PRO provides two types of security modes: Standard Security Mode
and High Security Mode [2]. Standard Security Mode is fairly simpler and
thus consumes less RAM than that of High Security Mode [2]. The features
of each mode is mentioned in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: Security Mode [2]
Feature Standard High
Network Layer security provided using a Network Key yes yes
APS Layer security provided using Link Keys yes yes
Centralized control and update of keys yes yes
Ability to switch from active to secondary keys yes yes
Ability to derive link keys between devices no yes
Entity authentication and permissions table support no yes
2.6 Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
Whatever the dictionary meaning of intrusion has, in computing security, it
refers to an attempt that may render a computer system down or accessing
unauthorized traffic or manipulating the information from such traffic. Such
attempts need not necessarily be successful. Even the unsuccessful attempts
are counted as intrusions for they are against security policies. Thus, it is
good idea to keep track of both successful and unsuccessful attempts of
intruding in the computer network. This helps to get knowledge of what
sort of traffic is flowing in a computer network and eventually assists in
designing more secure security policies. Usually, security professionals place
traffic monitoring devices; termed as sensors, in front (unsecured area) or
behind the firewall (secured area). Thereby, the traffic flowing in both sides
of the firewall are compared and analyzed. The preventive methods used
for deterring the malicious traffic, have generally three disadvantages. First,
preventive methods are unable to filter out certain wormhole and sinkhole,
second, they require large processing and storage, and finally, as wireless
network is affected by varieties of attacks, no single prevention method is
found efficient [33]. However, it does not mean to deploy multiple prevention
systems in a single network.
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2.6.1 Intrusion Detection Mechanisms
Different types of intrusion detection system are found in the network
security. Differentiation is made based on the techniques, such tools identify
the intrusions. In general, intrusion detection system is classified into two
groups:
Signature/Rule Based Detection
Signature based intrusion detection system implements signatures stored to
identify the attacks based on the database of well-known attacks. This
type of intrusion detection system consists of three stages. First, data
acquisition phase where the nodes monitor and collect the required data
from the network traffic for inspection. Second, rule application phase where
the data considered for analysis are fetched by application rules. Finally,
intrusion detection phase where alert signals are created based on abnormal
data pattern from that of normal data pattern [34]. Thus, such intrusion
detection tools have limited scope as new attacks are emerging day by day
in computer networks. The database of known attacks needs to be updated
frequently.
Anomaly Based Detection
In anomaly based detection method, a model is prepared for the normal
and expected traffic. Any traffic that does not follow the pattern of
normal traffic; are considered as anomaly. And thus, they are differentiated
as attacks or intrusions [35]. As anomaly based intrusion detection has
potentiality to coin out new attacks, they are preferred over signature based
intrusion detection system. This type of detection system has ability to
filter out new unknown threats, but at the same time, it is susceptible to
higher false positives. Anomaly based detection system is further classified




Figure 2.9 presents the diagrammatic presentation of different types of
intrusion detection mechanisms with quick overview.
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Figure 2.9: Classification of intrusion detection mechanisms
2.6.2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
Intrusions are malicious actions that tend to bypass the security system
of network systems. These actions attempt to break through integrity,
availability or confidentiality of computer a network resource. The definition
of Intrusion Detection System is found inconsistent. The definition differs
with different security researchers and experts. In a book named Intrusion
Detection & Prevention, Endorf, Schulz and Mellander define intrusion
detection system as a tool, a method or a system of resources with ability
to identify, assess and report unauthorized or unapproved network activity.
Such IDS do not detect intrusions by themselves. They detect the activities
being performed on network traffic, and not necessarily be intrusions.
Intrusion detection constitutes a part of the overall protection system,
installed in a device or a system.
One can make analogy of a computer protection system with that of
private house with valuable assets in it [19]. The locked doors act as firewalls,
security alarm as IDS and guard dogs as Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
The locked doors prevent authorized access in the building. They do not
alert about people knocking at the door. But, in case they enter the door,
security alarm alerts about their entry and thus, the possible threats that
may undertake. The guard dogs then, have their role in trying to prevent the
intruders run away and prevent the possible harms. Likewise, the firewall
just tries to drop the harmful traffics based on the policies defined for it.
The IDS alerts about intruders and IPS deploys the prevention policies to
nullify the possible threats from such intruders. Precisely, IDS is just a part
28
of security system. All these three components complement each other to
contribute as a security system.
The effectiveness and efficiency of security system are based on the
deployment of firewall, IDS and IPS. For example, the house will be more
secured if all the doors and windows are locked, security alarms are installed
in every doors and windows and many guard dogs are deployed. Similarly,
it is wise from security point of view to install firewalls, IDS and IPS at
every entry point to enhance the overall security system. Intrusion detection
consists of three steps [36]:
• Monitoring the network traffic and then analyzing
• Identifying the anomalous activities
• Assessing severity and generating alerts
2.6.3 Types of Intrusion Detection System
The intrusion detection and prevention system operates in layer three;
the network layer of the layered architecture. Like in antivirus, a set of
alert signatures are defined for the IDS, and they generate alerts based on
those set of rules defined to point out the malicious activities, undertaking
in the network. Such unwanted malicious activities need not always be
harmful. The unwanted activities may occur as misuse of system or network
equipment. In this regard, intrusion detection system can roughly divided
into two types: Misuse Detection and Anomaly Detection [33]. Misuse
Detection simply alerts about unwanted traffics in the network, based
on provided threat signatures. On the other hand, Anomaly Detection
generates alarm if the network traffic is found deviated from the normal
network traffic. The Anomaly Detection method are developed with ability
to learn from normal traffic and thus, are embedded with adaptive threats
detection capability. Further, intense study has been carried out for better
improvement of adaptability [33]. Different IDS have different threats
detection methods. The benefits of deploying IDS depend upon the detection
method chosen. An IDS can be knowledge-based, behavior-based, stand
alone or the combination of all. The knowledge-based IDSes generate alert
messages before any intrusion takes place, based on database of common
threats. Likewise, the behavior-based IDSes generate alerts tracking the
expected use of the resources by traffic. The stand alone IDSes operate
at background passively, monitoring and logging the network traffic and
logging the alerts in case any suspicious actions are being monitored. The
choice of organizational need of intrusion detection system is based on their
requirements.
Currently, three types of intrusion detection systems are under imple-
mentation:
i Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)
ii Network-Based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
iii Hybrid Intrusion Detection System
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Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)
Figure 2.10: Sample Host Based Intrusion Detection System, IDS agent is
installed in each computers as highlighted
HIDS consists of software installed in a host computer that examines all
the activities undertaking in the computer network. It scans the computer
resources and associated traffic. The idea is to implement the detection
system in all host computers. As the intrusion detection tool is installed in
every hosts, it ensures the efficient intrusion detection system. Figure 2.10
shows a general overview of a HIDS deployment. IDSes operation is based
on different log files such as kernel log files, system log files, firewall log
files, network log files and more. IDSes compare these log files against the
database of threat signatures [37]. Thus, a HIDS analyses different computer
system log files, makes analysis and compares with the known signatures for
threat recognition and creates own log files for the security analyst. IDS
may also check the data integrity of the files. It generates the checksum
of each file under consideration with message-file digest technique such as
md5sum or sha1sum [37]. These checksums are stored in a plain-text file
and compares the original files periodically to ensure the checksum integrity
with that of values stored in the plain text files. Tripwire SWATCH (Simple
Watcher), LIDS (Linux Intrusion Detection System) and RPM (Red-Hat
Packet Manager) Packet Manager are some examples of such host based
intrusion detection for Linux platform.
Network-Based Intrusion Detection System(NIDS)
NIDS has different philosophy in comparison with HIDS. It monitors and
analyses the network traffic either at router level or host level [37]. Then, the
packet information monitoring task is audited and logged to new file with
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Figure 2.11: Sample Network Based Intrusion Detection System
additional information in case any doubtful traffic are found. NIDS then,
compares such doubtful behavior with predefined threat signature database.
Finally, security messages are generated to alert the security professionals
about probable intrusions in the network. Figure 2.11 provides a general
overview of an NID deployment. NIDS has its significance in large network,
specially, internet where voluminous traffic flows each second. Thus, NIDS
is expected to be able to monitor such large traffic and successfully coin out
the malicious traffic. Most of the NIDSes require the network host device
to operate on promiscuous mode. This allows the host device to capture
each and every packets transferring in the network [37]. Tcpdump (Linux
application) and Wireshark (Windows application) are some tools that have
ability to capture large traffic flowing through the network. These tools can
just monitor and print the network traffic but do possess power to analyze
the traffic. Snort is as good example of NIDS. Snort threat signatures are
constantly updated and hence, it is considered as an efficient NIDS.
Hybrid Intrusion Detection System
Hybrid Intrusion Detection System comprises both HIDS and NIDS for
monitoring and analyzing host event occurring at host computers and
network traffic being transmitted in a network respectively. Hybrid Intrusion
Detection System is deployed to minimize the compromise in the security
level.
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2.7 Adaptive Intrusion Detection and Prevention
System (AIDPS)
A number of tools exist to control and prevent known malicious actions or
attacks in the wireless network. But, what about unknown or newly found
attacks? Large numbers of cases are occurring frequently about hacking
despite the presence of intrusion detection and prevention tools. This is
because, these tools still lack to coin out the unknown malicious actions.
An adaptive intrusion detection and prevention tool is supposed to filter
out every probable attacks though they are not defined in their database of
malicious actions. In fact, these types of tools must be equipped with ability
to analyze the network traffic so broadly and at core level that it can assure
the network is not compromised at all.
The development of efficient intrusion detection method is under
continuous progressive path. Yet, due to ever growing novel attacks and
hacks in wireless network, no fully efficient adaptive model has been coined
out. Various learning methods are being deployed for the development of
such fully adaptive efficient detection tools. Artificial intelligence, machine
learning and data mining techniques are being embedded with intrusion
detection system with motive of automating adaptive detection method
efficiently [33, 38, 39]. Wireless networks are application-driven network
where specific protocols exist for specific tasks. This requires intrusion
detection system be application specific [33]. However, the models developed
have limited scope as they are modeled for certain data sets and for
particular problems. In addition, while filtering out the traffic as anomalous
traffic, the adaptive intrusion detection tools often mark the valid traffics as
malicious traffics, and malicious traffics as general traffics. Such unwanted
behaviors are termed as false positive and false negative respectively [35]. An
adaptive intrusion detection and prevention system should be able to keep
both the false positive and false negative low. However, keeping them low has
been headache for the security professionals. Generally, infrequent traffic,
though valid, are filtered as malicious traffic, boosting the false positive
[35]. Thus, adaptive intrusion detection tools should be trained to build up
efficiency in avoiding filtering out valid infrequent traffic as malicious traffic
and invalid as valid.
Though a number of techniques are being deployed while building up
adaptive intrusion detection and prevention tools, none of the tools are fully
reliable. As the tools are developed focusing on specific types of malicious
behavior in network, they often fail to mark other types of such harmful
traffics during the data transmission.
2.7.1 AIDPS Background-Model Issues
Since, WLAN technology consists of random and unpredictable data traffic,
the task of building efficient model has been troublesome to security
designers. Reduction in cost and false positives are found considered by
most the researchers of adaptive intrusion detection system. The study of
different articles [33, 38, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43] on adaptive intrusion detection
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system shows the following design issues:
• Difficulty in choosing machine learning algorithm: Different learning
algorithms exist to facilitate the IDS to learn self. Markov Chain
algorithm, Data Mining technique, Statistic Method and Genetic
(Immunity-Based) algorithm are the commonly used machine learning
techniques. Cost and effectiveness of learning has been provided
central place. Each algorithm has been shown effective for the
implementation criteria they are considered for. Mostly, the learning
models are targeted towards specific types of intrusion detection.
For example, the learning models are either designed for detecting
intrusions in system calls or in network traffic. But, genetic learning
model has been proved most cost effective as it avoids the need for
expensive data sets for training the detection model. Ironically, such
algorithm increases the false positives [33, 38, 39].
• Choice of Data Set for Training the Detection Model: For training
the detection module to filter out the intrusions in the network
system, requires data sets. Mostly the data sets are taken from
DARPA [33, 38, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43]. But, these data sets are
expensive. Security professionals have thus focused on online learning
that is learning from the network traffic automatically. However, the
problem of fast convergence needs to be considered. Some data mining
techniques focus on building their own database of network traffic or
other computer system related data. This database in turn; is deployed
for providing the data set for training the detection module. Again
the choice of data set depends also upon implementation area of the
detection model. That is for what type of intrusions the model has
been designed for.
• Assumptions while Designing the Detection Model: The presence
of randomness in the network data system seems obstructing the
ideal model for adaptive intrusion detection system. Which model
has been considered as machine learning algorithm, still most of the
security professionals are bound to make some sorts of assumptions.
Sometimes, assumptions are made that there exists only certain types
of attacks in the network system. Thus, such models are generally
overlooking the other types of attacks. Often it is assumed that data
sets are provided in time for the detection module to be trained for
the new attacks before it gets late. Likewise, assumptions are also
made that data are labeled. This significantly increases the costs. On
the other hand, detection models require sophisticated training for the
unlabeled data.
2.8 Intrusion Detection and Prevention System
Tools
It has been more than few decades that the intrusion detection and
prevention tools have been brought into existence. However, with
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introduction of novel threats day by day, these tools are left obsolete. A
revolution is most in the field of intrusion detection and prevention system.
The traditional IDPS tools are no more efficient in fulfilling the ever growing
security requirements. Currently, concentration has been paid on adaptive
intrusion detection and prevention system tools. These tools are supposed
to learn about the novel threats that may not exist to the date. At the
same time, these tools are expected to reliable exhibiting absolute control
over false positive and false negative efficiently. Unfortunately, it is hard
to find till today. Only a handful of tools exist that claim themselves
to be fully adaptive. Most of them are commercial products. Intense
researches are going on in designing such security tools. Snort is one of
the intrusion detection tools that has been popular among the security
professionals. Several other IDS tools are found based on Snort Threat
Signature. Likewise, Cisco Adaptive Intrusion Detection and Prevention
Tool is one of the most popular commercial security tools in this field. The
following subsections discuss about some of the IDS, IPS and AIDPS.
2.8.1 Snort
Snort is one of the most of popular open source network intrusion detection
and prevention system. The tool can perform real-time analysis and logging
of network traffic [3, 44]. Snort was built up by Martin Roesch in 1998
and brought among the people by Sourcefire [3]. In general, the tool can
detect the attacks like buffer overflows, stealth port scans, SMB probes,
OS fingerprinting and CGI attacks. The threats are detected via protocol
analysis, content searching and content matching [44].
Snort is designed to operate in three modes, such as [45]:
• Sniffer Mode: This mode is selected if the motive is just to read the
flowing network traffic in the screen.
• Packet Logger Mode: This mode provides the flexibility of saving
the network traffic for future analysis.
• Intrusion Detection System Mode: This mode is the real
implementation of Snort which analyses the network traffic, compares
with defined threat signatures and takes action as directed.
Figure 2.12 shows the different components of the snort with quick
display of working steps [3]. The components are further discussed below
individually.
• Packet Capture Library: This is a software module that gathers
network traffic flowing through network adapter. For UNIX and Linux
Libcap Library is used while for Windows, Wincap is implemented.
• Packet Decoder: This part collects the layer-2 frame. Then, it
analyses the packet header for anomaly detection. Finally, the packet
are decoded for further investigation.
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Figure 2.12: Components of Snort depicting working procedure [3]
• Pre-processors: Pre-processors do the task of arranging and
modifying the data before handing over to Detection Engine. In
addition, they can detect certain basic of anomalies. Snort has
different types of pre-processors. Some of them are discussed below:
a. Frag 3 Pre-processor: It deals with overlapping fragmented
packets that might avoid detection or prevention system.
b. Stream 5 Pre-processor: This Pre-processor facilitates snort
with state and session awareness. Thus, snort can detect even
out-of-state packets resulted from Nmap tool.
c. HttpInspect Pre-processor: It processes the Universal Re-
source Identifier (URI) through extracting and decoding the hexa-
decimal or other expressions present in the URI.
• Detection Engine: This is the core part among the Snort
components. It operates in transport and network layer where it
analyzes the packets contents based on defined signature attacks.
• Output Plug-ins: This component controls the presentation of
output produced after alerting and logging. As it’s function, it may
produce log reports by logging alert reports or logging in the database
or sending message to Syslog Server.
Snort was initially developed for wired network but due to growing
concern on wireless security, developers of snort have enhanced the tool
in a way that it can operate under WLAN wireless standard 802.11 [46].
2.8.2 Suricata
Suricata is an efficient Network IDS, IPS and Network Security Monitoring
engine. The tool was developed by Open Information Security Foundation
(OISF) [47]. The developer of the Suricata claims that the tool is as efficient
as Snort [3].
Features
The official site of the Suricata recommends to try it for the following three
features [47]:
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a. Highly Scalable: The tool is multi threaded. As such, Suricata balances
the load across the sensor nodes on which the tool is configured to be
deployed. This provides high speed performance in the network.
b. Protocol Identification: Suricata has ability to recognize the most
common protocols. This makes possible for the rule writers to create
rule based on protocols avoiding the need to have information about
ports. The Protocol Identification feature depicts Suricata uniquely as a
Malware Command and Control Channel hunter. Further, with dedicated
keywords, one can compare protocol fields; ranging from http URI to SSL
certificate identifier [47].
c. File Identification, MD5 (Message Digestion 5) Checksums, and
File Extraction: Suricata is built with ability to identify thousands of
file types. In addition, the tool can extract the file flowing in the network
in local disk, for later analysis or inspection. Also, Suricata has flexibility
of calculating the MD5 checksum that the users in network either can to
maintain or discard from the network.
Besides, the tool has a number of additional features and can operate in
multiple platforms like Windows, Linux, Mac, FreeBSD etc [3, 47].
2.8.3 OSSEC
OSSEC is a host-based intrusion detection system that is provided for
free. The tool provides anomaly detection system through log analysis,
file integrity checking, and rootkit detection. In addition, OSSEC monitors
policy, does real-time alerting and provides active response. The tool is
compatible with most of the operating systems [48].
Originally, OSSEC was brought into existence by Danial B. Cid [48]in
order to overcome the scalability problem of Tripwire. These days, it is
supported by a company named Trend Micro. OSSEC performs profile and
signature based analysis to detecting intrusions [48, 49].
Features
OSSEC is accumulates most of the aspects of HIDS, log monitoring and
SIM/SIEM in a simple way but as powerful tool. The following are the key
features of the OSSEC tool [48]:
a. File Integrity Checking: Through File Integrity Checking (often
termed as File Integrity Monitoring (FIM)), OSSEC checks for any
changes in file, directory or even registry. If any such instances do exist,
then, OSSEC generates alerts. Such changes can either be attacks or
simply misuses.
b. Log Monitoring: OSSEC can read and analyze the log files created by
the operating system. Any suspicious actions suggested by these log files
are alerted by the tool. These log files may record information about
application installations, changes in the firewall rules etc.
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c. Rootkit Detection: Hackers or anomalies always intend to hide their
malicious actions, but through Rootkit Detection, OSSEC can reveal such
malicious actions that might hamper the computer system.
d. Active Response: OSSEC is built with feature of Active Response.
This makes possible to take actions immediately whenever threats are
suspected in the network. Thus, one time configuration is enough to take
real time action in the process of combating the anomalous activities.
2.8.4 Bro
Bro is a network-based open source intrusion detection system. Thus, the
primarily focus of Bro is on network security monitoring. However, the
tool puts some weight on analysis of general network traffic too. Bro was
developed by Vern Paxson [3] 15 years ago. Currently it is backed by Paxson
with his team at International Computer Science Institute, Berkeley, CA and
the National Center for Supercomputing Applications, Urbana-Champagain,
IL [50]. Bro’s policy scripts are created by it’s own Bro Scripting Language.
Bro has a tool named BroControl which assists in managing multiple Bro
nodes in parallel. Bro is also a single threaded tool [3, 51].
Features
Bro comes with the following features some of which differentiate it from
the rest of the intrusion detection system [50]:
a. Adaptable: Bro provides the site-specific monitoring policies through
domain-specific scripting language.
b. Efficient: Bro concentrates on high-performance and wide deployment
platform.
c. Flexible: Bro is far from traditional threat signature definitions and is
not based on any single detection methods.
d. Forensics: Bro logs the network traffic that is under monitoring and
provides higher level of presentation.
e. In-depth Analysis: Bro can analyze many protocols and can perform
semantic analysis at application layer at efficiently.
f. Highly Stateful: Bro keeps track of application layer state while
monitoring the traffic.
2.8.5 Tripwire
Tripwire is a host based intrusion detection system that checks for files
and directories integrity. The tool checks for alterations in such files and
directories with automated cron job. Any misconducts in file integrity are
notified through email. Tripwire constantly monitors the system for any
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possible changes. In addition, it facilitates with prompt recovery by filtering
out only the corrupted files for remaking [52].
Tripwire typically uses the baseline database of the file locations and
modification dates for comparing the files directories integrity. This baseline
is created by with snapshots of the files and directories while in secure state
[52, 53].
2.8.6 Sourcefire Next-Generation Intrusion Prevention Sys-
tem (NGIPS)
With focus on overcoming the shortcomings of first generation IPS,
Sourcefire has developed the Next-Generation Intrusion Detection System
(NGIPS). The tool is endorsed by Gartner [54]. The NGIPS provides the
enhanced capabilities required to secure computer network from emerging
threats. The concept behind the tool is contextual awareness about network
traffic, systems and applications, users and other network components.
This contextual awareness provides quick recognition of threats and takes
appropriate actions. NGIPS is also claimed to be cost effective [54]. Unlike,
other tools discussed above, Sourcefire NGIPS is a commercial product.
Features
In addition to conventional features present in the first generation IPS,
Sourcefire NGIPS has the following features [54]:
a. Inline Bump-in-the-Wire Configuration: Sourcefire NGIPS does
not disrupt the network traffic even the tools encounters hardware or
software failure. The tool has option of operating as “fail-open” which
ensures network traffic flow though any detection may not occur.
b. Application Awareness and Full-Stack Visibility: Sourcefire claim
“Sourcefire NGIPS is the first and only IPS provider to offer passive,
real-time network intelligence gathering” [54]. The tool can perform the
task of limiting the use of operating system and related applications in
the network. Thus, it shrinks the area of possible attack in the network,
thereby, reducing the volume of risk.
c. Contextual Awareness: Sourcefire NGIPS can prioritize threats
detection and take action accordingly or even may not take action
if not needed. The tool can gather information about existing and
network devices added in the network, can keep track of various network
applications like operating systems, VoIP systems, printers etc., and
identify the users of the network. The tool can then create scenario
proactively before any such network components may create intrusions.
Thus, can take action prior to threat encounters.
In addition, Sourcefire NGIPS is featured with efficient automated IPS
tuning as the tool keeps track information of every network elements. The
tool is also embedded with features to get integrated with other network
components.
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d. Content Awareness: In addition to the ability of filtering out the
traditional threats like worms, trojans, buffer overflows and DoS attacks,
Sourcefire NGIPS is capable of detecting threats that might emerge from
the content of the files like PDFs and Microsoft Office files.
2.8.7 Cisco Adaptive Wireless Intrusion Prevention System
Cisco Adaptive Wireless Intrusion Prevention System is an advanced
security software for combating wireless threats like network anomalies,
unauthorized accesses and RF attacks [55]. The Cisco Wireless IPS is one of
the constituents of the Cisco 3300 Series Mobility Services Engine platform
with location-aware technology. The tool is provided with proactive threat
detection capability [55].
Features
Cisco is one of the advanced tools in the field of adaptive wireless intrusion
detection and prevention system. It comes with the following features [55]:
a. The tool provides the complete wireless anomaly detection and preventive
actions in the wireless network infrastructure.
b. The tool provides cost-effective security solutions in the wireless network.
c. The tool ensures the wireless security through rogue access point
monitoring, detecting ad-hoc connection and detecting wireless hacking.
Additionally, it does the task of self optimization, security management
and reporting.
2.8.8 Kismet
Kismet is a WLAN security tool which can sniff and check for intrusions in
the wireless network. Kismet also provides security breach check in other
than 802.11 wireless standard. Particularly, it serves for 802.11b, 802.11a,
802.11g and 802.11n network traffics. The only requirement for Kismet to
get deployed is that wireless network card should support monitoring mode
[56].
Kismet passively detects and collects the network traffic. It checks for
the hidden networks and non-beaconing networks through such collected
data packages [56].
Features
Kismet is one of the few open source wireless intrusion detection tools. It has
the following features while serving as wireless intrusion detection system
[56]:
a. It functions as both stateless and stateful intrusion detection system and
can detect threats like fingerprints (single packet attack) and trends like
unexpected probes, disassociation flood, etc.
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b. Kismet can easily be integrated with other tools like Snort. Such tools
can process the Kismet captured data traffic for further analysis.
c. Kismet can operate in mobile or channel hopping installations, but;
accuracy may be compromised.
2.8.9 RFProtect Wireless Intrusion Protection
RFProtect Wireless Intrusion Protection is developed by Aruba Networks.
The tool detects the wireless threats in the form of either wireless attack,
impersonations or intrusions. Any mismatches with defined signatures
are filtered out as threats in the wireless network. Unlike many other
commercial products, the RFProtect is integrated in the wireless network
system, thereby, avoiding the need for dedicated wireless sensors [57]. Hence,
this product is comparatively cost effective [57].
Features
The features mentioned for RFProtect are not new in the field of intrusion
detection system. But, still they worth much when it comes to wireless
security. The following features are enlisted by Aruba Networks for
RFProtect [57]:
a. Integrated Wireless Intrusion Detection and Prevention: RF-
Protect is directly integrated within the wireless network device, thus it
obviates the need for separate wireless overlay IDS and sensors.
b. Automatic Threat Mitigation: RFProtect keeps track of unauthor-
ized clients and ad-hoc networking through forensic data evaluation. The
tools blocks such clients from being connected to the network.
c. Customizable Security Polices: This feature adds flexibility of
defining the security policies as per deployment needs. The criteria can
be based on location, device or configuration.
d. Automated Compliance Reporting: RFProtect does the task of
reporting about the actions performed automatically. Thus, it saves time
and reduces complexity avoiding user intervention.
Figure 2.13 provides the brief overview of all the tools discussed above.
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  Tool	   Platform	   Type	   N/W	   Threat	   Source	   Detection	  
Snort	   Almost	  all	   NIDS	   Wired/	  wireless	  
Buffer	  overflow,	  stealth	  port	  scan,	  SMB	  probes,	  OS	  fingerprinting,	  CGI	  attacks	  
Open	  source	   Rule	  based,	  anomaly	  based	  
Suricata	   Most	   NIDS	   Wired	   Known	  threats	   Open	  source	   Rule	  based,	  anomaly	  based	  
Ossec	   Most	   HIDS	   Wired/	  wireless	  
File	  integrity	  breach,	  rootkit	  detection	   Open	  Source	   Rule	  based	  Bro	   Unix	   NIDS	   Wired	   N/A	   Open	  source	   Pattern	  based	  
Tripwire	   Most	   HIDS	   Wired	   File	  and	  directory	  integrity	  breach	   Open	  source	   Audit	  assessment	  
Kismet	   Almost	  all	   IDS	   Wireless	  
Fingerprints,	  unexpected	  probes,	  dissociation	  flood	  
Open	  source	   Packet	  sniffing	  
RFProtector	   N/A	   IDS/	  IPS	   Wireless	  
DoS	  Attack,	  Man-­‐in-­‐the	  –middle	  attack,	  unauthorized	  access,	  rogue	  AP	  
Commercial	   Rule	  based	  
Cisco	  Adaptive	  IPS	   N/A	   NIDS	   Wireless	  
Rogue	  Aps,	  DoS	  attack,	  authentication,	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐middle	  attack	  
Commercial	  
	  	  Rule	  based,	  anomaly	  based	  	  	  
Source-­‐fire	  NGIPS	   N/A	   IDS	   Wired/	  Wireless	   Known,	  adaptive	   Commercial	   Contextual	  awareness	  based	  	  anomaly	  	  
Figure 2.13: Table briefing the IDS/IPS discussed above
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2.9 Network Simulators
Simulators are the tools that provide the figurative and functional
representation of a system. The simulator even demonstrates the internal
working procedure of the system components which in reality are hidden by
the real devices. Simulators enlighten the hidden working principles that are
generally known to just experts of the related systems. More importantly,
simulators provide the platform for testing applicability and reliability new
systems before they are deployed in the real environment. Thus, simulator
prevents from the real risk of failure. In addition, it saves the cost of testing
new systems obviating the need for buying infrastructures before hand.
Generally, simulators are implemented for simulating the applicability of
new systems and sophisticated systems. Computer network is one of such
sophisticated systems where simulators are highly deployed. These network
simulators have made it possible to check for the implementational feasibility
of different computer networks ranging from pervasive sensor networks
to satellite networks. Different network simulators are also deployed to
simulate various wireless sensor networks. WSN (Wireless Sensor Network)
simulators are mainly used to confirm the applicability of new protocols
in the wireless sensors network [58]. However, these simulators are still
not completely built up to simulate the sensor networks fully, specially, not
for 802.15.4 networks. The following discussion provides the overview of
different network simulators that can be deployed for simulating wireless
sensor network.
2.9.1 Network Simulator -2 (NS-2)
Network Simulator version 2 or NS-2 is one of the oldest network simulator.
This is an open source tool and initially developed for simulating NS-
2. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and National Science
Foundation are behind NS-2 improvement. The tool is based on object
oriented programming language, typically C++ and built primarily for
Linux environment [59, 58]. NS-2 tool provides well defined online
documentation.
NS-2 is not facilitated with graphical interface, thus, users need to have
sound coding or scripting skills. Since, NS-2 is originally developed for IP
network, it also lacks the proper functionality for wireless sensor network
[58]. The tool falls short of consistency and accuracy. In addition, the
tool cannot accommodate more than 100 sensor nodes, thus bears scability
problem too. However, NS-2 can be used to simulate simple wireless sensor
network.
2.9.2 Avrora
Avrora is a Java based open source simulation tool developed by University
of California, LA Compilers group [60]. The tool can efficiently simulate
wireless sensor network but misses graphical interface. Avrora does not
provide support for network management as it does not hold network
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communication tool [58]. Avrora is faster and scalable simulation tool. The
tool can simulate more than 1000 nodes at once. As the tool is developed
with Java, it provides flexibility too.
2.9.3 OMNeT++
OMNeT++ is a network simulator built in C++. It can be found in
both free licensed version for academic and non-profit research purpose and
commercial for others. However, it provides broad open source framework
and mode. The tool can operate on Linux, Windows and Unix [61]. The
tool is highly advanced and sophisticated.
The OMNeT++ is efficient for simulation both wired and wireless
network. It supports wireless sensor network and provides free model named
MiXin for particularly simulating ZigBee network. The OMNeT++ provides
graphical interface. One can easily simulate even power consumption in
wireless sensor network. However, as large team is behind development
of the tool, often the compatibility problem arises while simulating with
different models [58]. The graphical interface provides efficient platform for
debugging the simulation but still the OMNeT++ requires sound knowledge
of programming (C++) while simulating the advance computer network.
2.9.4 Opnet Modeler
Opnet Modeler Wireless Suite is an efficient simulator for wireless network.
The model can be implemented for simulating a wide variety of wireless
networks [30]. One of the most promising feature of the OPNET Modeler
is it’s graphical interface which provides users with easy implementation,
eliminating the burden of working with background coding. This feature
has helped it surmount other network simulators. The OPNET Modeler is
basically a commercial product. However, for the non-profitable research
and for the academic use, the OPNET provides free six-month license [30].
The OPNET supports even personal area networks like Bluetooth,
ZigBee etc. It also supports Satellite simulation. The model can be deployed
for analyzing the end-to-end functionality and examine network performance
from small wireless network like Bluetooth network to Satellite network [30].
The official website for the OPNET [30] writes that the simulator has the
following features:
• It is the fastest simulator
• It has a complete library of hundreds of network protocols and vendor
device models.
• It is a scalable and customizable wireless modeler.
• IT provides integrated, GUI-based debugging and analysis.
• It provides open interface providing path for integrating external
models, libraries and even simulators.





This chapter provides the overview on what experiments will be carried out
and how they will be carried out to address the objective of this research.
Details on these are mentioned below.
3.1 Methodology
To resolve the issues mentioned in the problem statements above, the overall
task will be divided into three sections. In the first section, attacks of concern
will be generated, the second section will analyze the attack and the third
section will make attempts to detect and prevent the attack. To accomplish
these tasks, two lab set-ups will be made in two environment.
As the WBAN technology is still under research, no concrete procedures
are available to carry on the tests. Considering the complexities, that may
arise due to unavailability of hardware and firmwares, device-specific tests
other than the available devices in the ASSET lab, will be carried on a
wireless network simulator. For example, DoS attacks can be accomplished
through different techniques. Often attackers deploy special wireless signal
jamming device which are easily available in market. In addition, devices
with specifications, similar to the devices used in the network might be
deployed to create DoS attacks. In order to tests all these possible attacks,
simulation work will be carried out as it avoids the need of acquiring real
devices for experimenting.
Every planned tasks cannot be accomplished through simulator alone.
All other feasible tests will be carried on the ASSET laboratory environment.
Thus, simulator and physical lab will be two platforms to accomplish the
desired tests. The most threatening attacks in the WBAN, that is DoS
attacks, will be carried through wireless network simulator named the
OPNET Wireless Modeler Suite. Eavesdropping, Integrity and Replay
Attack will be tested in the physical lab.
The following section discusses on different hardware and software tools
considered for the thesis work and plan for the executing the task. The
reason behind selection of hardware and software, and procedures are also
be mentioned.
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3.1.1 Hardware and Software Tools
As this thesis work is based on 802.15.4 network, different hardware other
than commonly used devices like computers, routers and switches; are also
needed. The ASSET lab-set-up contains the following hardware devices as
mentioned in Table 3.1 [62]. Among them Telosb Tmote Sky and Atmel AVR
Raven ATAVRRZUSBSTICK are added for to facilitate security analysis
work. Specifications are adopted from [63, 64, 65].




Processor : Intel Core 2 Due
OS : Ubuntu 12.04 32-bit
Shimmer Sensor
I/O : 3 colored led indicators
RAM : 10 KB
Flash : 48 KB
Frequency : 8 MHz
Shimmer Span
I/O :3 colored led indicators
Processing : MSP430F1611 CPU
Communication : TIC2420 802.15.4 radio transceiver
Form Factor : USB flashdrive
Telosb Tmote Sky
I/O : 16-pin expansion support and optional
SMA antenna connector
Radios : 802.15.4 Radio
CPU : MSP430F1611 CPU Datasheet/Users Guide
Storage : Uses the ST M25P80 40MHz serial
code flash for external data and code
ATAVRRZUSBSTICK
Frequency : 2.4 GHz
Interface Type: USB
Category : ZigBee/802.15.4 Development Tools
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Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the pictures of sensor devices that have
been deployed.
Figure 3.1: A Shimmer Span and A Shimmer End Device
Figure 3.2: A Telosb Tmote Sky and A Atmel AVR RAVEN RZUSBSTICK
sensors
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the hardware and their purposes.
In order to make devices mentioned above work, different types of
firmwares are needed. Since experiments will be conducted in simulator,
a simulation software will be used in addition. Table 3.3 provides the quick
vision of different types of software and firmwares that will be used with
their purposes.
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Table 3.2: Hardware that are planned to be used in experiments
Hardware Quantity Purpose
Laptop 1 Collecting data, monitoring
and analyzing the results
of the experiment
Shimmer Span 1 Collecting data from
Shimmer nodes
Shimmer node 5 Sensing and preparing data
for Shimmer node
Telosb 1 Emulating the 802.15.4
network data for Wireshark
AVR Raven 1 Generating attacks in
the 802.15.4 network
Table 3.3: Software and firmwares that are planned to be deployed in experiments
Software/firmware Device Associated Purpose
OPNET Modeler Laptop Carry on simulation work
Tiny OS Laptop Provide communicating platform
for sensor devices
Wireshark Laptop Analyze 802.15.4 traffic
PPPSniffer Telosb Feed 802.15.4 data to Wireshark
KillerBee AVR RAVEN Create attack on 802.15.4
network
Goodfet Telosb Sniff and analyze 802.15.4
traffic
Scapy Telosb Decode and dissect 802.15.4
traffic
3.1.2 Plan and Procedure
1. Generation of Attack: Different types of attacks will be implemen-
ted as mentioned earlier in two parts as simulation work and physical
lab work.
i. Simulation Work:
As a simulation work, the simulation of DoS attack will be
performed in two scenarios. An alternative approach to conduct
simulation work is also mentioned below:
a. Scenario 1: The first scenario will conduct experiments
on DoS attack that may arise due to malicious devices or
misbehaving devices within the network. The malicious
node will generate large volume of traffic, targeted to the
base station. This scenario represents the environment for
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both intentional or unintentional resource consuming malicious
tasks, resulted from within the network. One of the devices,
will be misconfigured to consume more network resources.
b. Scenario 2: Here, jammer nodes, which create specific
interference in the wireless network, will be deployed. These
jammer nodes may also result in congestion in the network,
resulting loss of packets. Jammer nodes will be created via
simulator. This scenario will represent the intentional DoS
attack that might be encountered through different easily
available wireless signal jamming devices.
ii. Physical Laboratory Work: The lab set-up will include a
network of five Shimmer Nodes, a Shimmer Span Module and
a laptop as analyzer. The nodes will be configured with star
topology. As mentioned earlier, eavesdropping, integrity and
replay attack will be tested on physical laboratory. All the
mentioned malicious tasks will be tried to accomplish through the
modification on the firmware configured in the Shimmer Modules
and make it operate as malicious node. The scenario will represent
a case where hackers and attackers introduce their misbehaving
devices in the network and try to sniff, modify or regenerate the
traffic.
2. Analysis of Attack
Wireshark is the one of the commonly used packet analyzer. This tool
will be used to analyze the traffic generated by both the simulator
and the physical lab. Typically, Wireshark is developed for IP
packet analysis. Thus, it is not able to analyze the packet generated
by 802.15.4 network directly. The packet generated by the ZigBee
network (802.15.4 standard) is different from IP network traffic. So,
the PPPSniffer will be installed in one of the Shimmer node to
function it as bridge to emulate the 802.15.4 traffic to pcap traffic
that Wireshark understands.
3. Detection of Attack: Snort and Kismet are the intrusion detection
tools that will be implemented as intrusion detection systems. Snort
is typically developed as network intrusion detection system for the
wired network. Thus, an attempt will be made to find out if the
Snort functions in the traffic converted by the PPPSniffer. Else, as an
alternative attempt, traffic analyzed by the Wireshark or other packet
analyzer will be fed to snort for oﬄine reading. Kismet is developed
for 802.11 based wireless network. Thus, similar attempt will be made
to figure out if the Kismet can recognize the traffic emulated by the
PPPSniffer. If the tools are able to detect intrusions, comparison
of their performance will be made based on their ability to detect




Since, the hardware and software that are going to be implemented are
unusual, the proposed plan may not produce the desired output. Possibilities
do exist that these hardware and software may not be compatible with each
other or not feasible in the platform under consideration. The following
alternatives are provided for both hardware and software:
• Alternative Simulator: Network Simulator OPNET Modeler
Wireless Suite, considered for the simulation work, is sophisticated
though it provides graphical interface. As ZigBee network is still
in nascent stage, the considered the OPNET Modeler has ZigBee
implementation but not fully functional as expected. In case; this
simulator creates complications, the OMNeT++ will be considered
as alternative for simulation work. The OMNeT++ also supports
802.15.4 network with graphical interface.
• Alternative Devices: The proposed plan may not produce the
desired output as possibilities exist that these hardware and software
may not be compatible with each other or not feasible in the
platform under consideration. Telosb Tmote Sky will be an alternative
hardware. This TelosB Tmote Sky will be configured with the Goodfet
firmware and KillerBee firmware. As a result, this device may assist in
sniffing the network traffic and also making replay attack and injection
attack.
• Alternative Package Analyzer: In case, Wireshark is not able to
analyze the traffic generated by ZigBee network, TCPdump will be
considered as an alternative. Since, TCPdump is originally developed
for Linux environment, it functions as package analyzer after necessary
modification is made on the ZigBee traffic.
• Alternative Approach in Intrusion Detection: As the proposed
IDS are not meant to work on ZigBee network, they may face
compatibility issues. In order to emulate the traffic into IP packet
format, WSBridge will be considered as an alternative. This firmware
will be configured with Telosb Tmote Sky to make it operate as
802.15.4 traffic to IP packet emulator.
In case, these intrusion detection tools do not found feasible at all,
theoretical approach will be followed. This theoretical approach will
illustrate the need for the intrusion detection system in Wireless
Body Area Network. The approach will discuss on the reason behind
inability of the IDS tools to function on 802.15.4 network. Finally, the
approach will also propose the possible techniques to accomplish the
task.
3.1.4 Summary of Proposed Methodology
In short, the following task will be executed:
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a. Simulation Work
i. DoS Attack from Misbehaving Node
• Create a ZigBee simulation platform similar to ASSET lab
• Create a misbehaving node altering the parameters of one of the
sensor node
• Analyze the effect of the misbehaving node through simulator
and Wireshark
• Analyze the traffic generated by misbehaving node through Snort
and Kismet
• Propose the better tool based on their performance in the attack
environment considered
ii. DoS Attack from Jammer Node
• Create a ZigBee simulation platform similar to ASSET lab
• Create a jammer using simulator node model and deploy it in
the simulation network
• Analyze the effect of the jammer node through simulator and
Wireshark
• Analyze the traffic generated by misbehaving node through Snort
and Kismet
• Propose the better tool based on their performance in the attack
environment considered
b. Physical Laboratory Work
• Create a network of Shimmer Nodes, Shimmer Span Module and a
laptop using star topology
• Create packet sniffer, packet injector and packet replay attacker
using the Shimmer Node and introduce them into the network
• Analyze the possible threats generated by attacker node through a
set of PPPSniffer configured device and Wireshark
• Analyze the intrusion generated the attacker node through Snort
and Kismet






This chapter discusses on the experimental setup, both simulation and
physical lab setup, implemented for the tests, details on procedure and
methodology followed and the results obtained from both experiments.
Each section is discussed under their respective topics as mentioned below.
Analysis of the result is conducted at the latter part of this chapter.
4.1 Experimental Setup I
The experimental set-up for the task was designed as proposed. The tests
were carried on in the simulator - OPNET Modeler Wireless Suite, version
17.5. The figure 4.1 represents the general experimental setup designed
in the simulator. A platform of 50m*50m area was created to conduct
simulation experiments. The network consists of a ZigBee coordinator, a
ZigBee router and 5 ZigBee end devices. The end devices were the sensors
that collect data from physical environment based on motion of the body
parts. The destination of traffic from these devices was ultimately the
Coordinator. The default parameters were selected for all the devices except
the destination of traffic for each device. All the end devices were set to send
the data gathered to the Coordinator through router. The Coordinator was
set with destination as router. Figure 4.2 shows the parameter selection
for the Coordinator and end devices respectively. The simulation task was
accomplished in two scenarios. In both scenarios, focus was made on load
experienced by the Coordinator and the packets dropped by the Coordinator
under such loads. Each experiments in the simulation work was simulated
for 7 hours to resemble the physical lab experiment-time duration.
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Figure 4.1: General simulation network setup
Figure 4.2: Parameters selection for ZigBee coordinator and end device sensors
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4.1.1 Scenario 1:
The experimental setup for the scenario 1 was as shown in Figure 4.3. The
experiment was initiated with normal operation where all the end device
sensors send normal traffic to the Coordinator. Later on, a misbehaving
node was created and implemented as attacking node for the Coordinator.
Initially, all nodes sent constant packets of size 1024 bits. But, the attacking
node was made to send larger traffic. In each test, the size of the packet was
increased by 1024 bits. The experiment was carried on till the packet size
reached 40960 bits. Figure 4.4 exhibits the effect seen on load and packets
dropped by the Coordinator as a result of the misbehaving node. Likewise,
Figure 4.5 shows the load increasing on Coordinator with increase in packet
size sent from the misbehaving node.
Figure 4.3: Network setup with misbehaving node
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Figure 4.4: Load on coordinator before and after introduction of misbehaving node
Figure 4.5: Pattern of load-change on coordinator with increased packet size on
misbehaving node
4.1.2 Scenario 2:
In the second lab setup, a jammer node was introduced instead of
misbehaving node. The jammer node was place as shown in Figure 4.6.
The jammer node was selected from the standard jammer nodes present
in the simulator. Experiments were then carried on to find out the
effects on Coordinator before and after the introduction of jammer nodes.
Figure 4.7 provides overview of packets dropped and load encountered by
the Coordinator under both conditions.
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Figure 4.6: Network setup with one jammer node
Figure 4.7: Attributes selected for jammer node and traffic lost by the Coordinator
4.2 Experimental Setup II
The second lab setup consisted of three computers, one Shimmer Span
module as a Coordinator, five Shimmer sensors, one Telosb Tmote Sky
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transceiver one Atmel AVR Raven transceiver. Shimmer Span module,
KillerBee device and the Telosb Goodfet device were configured in three
different computers. The sensors and the Span module were organized with
star topology. The sensors were put on the body. The sensors used to
collect gyroscopic data based on the body movements. Those sensed data
were transferred to the Span module and the module would then supplied
the data to the computer, it was attached with.
Different tests were conducted with focus on packet network scanning,
packet sniffing and packet injection. The Telosb device; configured with the
Goodfet firmware was made to sniff the 802.15.4 data flowing in the network.
Likewise, Atmel AVR Raven was configured with KillerBee firmware. The
device could scan the 802.15.4 network, dump the network traffic and make
replay attack. The attacks were accomplished in three scenarios:
4.2.1 Scenario 1:
In the first lab experiment, the KillerBee device was deployed as attacking
node and the Telosb Goodfet device was implemented as monitoring node.
KillerBee device was deployed to scan the 802.15.4 network. Through
zbstumbler command, the device generated beacon request broadcasts.
Then, the device recorded the PAN-id of the responding devices and the
channel number used by them. The beacon requests sent from the KillerBee
device was monitored through the Telosb Goodfet device. This Goodfet
device was set to sniff the packets flowing in the network in all channels.
Figure 4.8 shows an instance of beacon request broadcast sent from the
KillerBee device.
Figure 4.8: Beacon request sent from the KillerBee device for scanning the network
The embedded code for the sniffing command (goodfet.ccspi) was
modified so that it could decode and dissect the 802.15.4 hex traffics to
understandable format. Figure 4.9 depicts the dissected beacon request
that is highlighted in Figure 4.8. Data in the blue box represents the beacon
request and that in the orange box represents the channel number that the
beacon request is generated at.
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Figure 4.9: Dissected beacon request to readable format
4.2.2 Scenario 2:
In the second experiment, sniffing, capturing and replay attack were tested.
The KillerBee device was implemented to dump the traffic flowing in the
network in different formats. Figure 4.10 highlights the KillberBee zbdump
command used to capture packets and number of packets captured.
Figure 4.10: Traffic captured through KillberBee zbdump command
The captured packets were then resent in the network through another
KillerBee command zbreplay. Figure 4.11 demonstrates the KillberBee
command used and the packets resent in the network in channel number
12. The packets resent in the network was monitored through the Goodfet
device. Figure fig:replayattack.png exhibits an instance of the packets
resent from the attacking node that is KillerBee device. Similarly, zbdsniff
command was executed to find out the network key as shown in Figure 4.13
Figure 4.11: Replay attack on channel 12
4.2.3 Scenario 3:
The experimental setup for the scenario 2 was further extended for
experimenting selective jamming attack on channel number 26. The replay
attack made in the previous scenario was modified to insert huge amount
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Figure 4.12: Display of packet injected through replay attack
Figure 4.13: Capturing of Network Key flowing in the network
of traffic, in billions into the channel 26 of the network. Though it was for
shorter time, the network seemed highly occupied by the replayed packets.
There was great reduce in sent traffic from end devices. Figure 4.14 shows
the reduction in sent packets due to selective jamming attack in channel 26.
4.3 Decoding of 802.15.4 traffic
In order to decode the sniffed traffic flowing in the above experiments for
understanding and analyzing them, the Goodfet configured Telosb device
and PPPSniffer configured Telosb device were used. The Telosb device
with the Goodfet firmware would show decoded traffic through terminals
as shown in Figure 4.9. The PPPSniffer firmware flashed Telosb device,
on the other hand, operated as a bridge between 802.15.4 protocol and
Wireshark. The PPPSniffer would feed data from 802.15.4 network to
Wireshark and Wireshark would decode and dissect traffic into 802.15.4
format. An example of such traffic dissection through Wireshark is shown
in Figure 4.15.
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Figure 4.14: Effect of selective jamming attack on 802.15.4 network
Figure 4.15: Analysis of 802.15.4 traffic through Wireshark
4.4 Analysis
This section presents the analysis of the result obtained from the above
experiments. Analysis of the results is arranged in accordance with order
of the experiments carried out above. Analysis is presented under similar
headings as mentioned above to ease the task and also to provide a structure
to analysis.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup I
The experiments; carried on in the OPNET simulator generated mostly




When the network was designed to work in normal setup that is without
any attacks or interference, the performance of the Coordinator node was
smooth. There were no any packet losses in the network. In addition, the
data sent from the Coordinator and other end sensor nodes were constant.
This illustrated the smooth operation of ZigBee network as expected.
However, as the load from one of the nodes (misbehaving node) was
increased, the performance of the Coordinator was observed deteriorating
as shown in Figure 4.4. As the data traffic from the misbehaving node
went on increasing, the Coordinator started experiencing higher load and
the Coordinator resource was consumed in handling those traffic in addition
to normal traffic from the normal behaving sensor nodes. As a result, there
was increase in load on Coordinator and degradation in the packets sent
from the Coordinator in the network. However, when the parameters in the
misbehaving node was altered to send around 40960 bits per second, the
result obtained was quite unexpected but interesting. At that point, the
load on the Coordinator started reducing as shown by Figure 4.5 . This
is because, the misbehaving node has its own limitation. ZigBee devices
are though designed to operate at low power, still may face energy problem
if load on them are increased. The Coordinator device on the other hand
is out of higher energy problem as the device is connected to the laptop.
Hence, with increasing load on misbehaving node, might have increased the
energy consumption. For this reason, the device might not have been able
to generate constant load on the Coordinator till death. However, it could
be confirmed if there had been provision of checking energy level of ZigBee
end devices in the simulator.
Scenario 2:
With introduction of jammer node in the network, the result viewed was
normal. As expected, there was loss in traffic sent from the Coordinator.
This is because, the jammer node creates heavy traffic in the network. The
objective of such traffic is just to occupy the channels preventing the data
communication between end sensor nodes and the central Coordinator node.
There was no change in data sent from the end devices. This might be
because of jamming traffic wouldn’t create load on end devices. These
devices were set to send sensed data rather than receiving other data other
than control information from Coordinator. However, as the data sent from
end devices could not reach the destination Coordinator node, it had less
data to respond with. Thus, there was reduction in follow-up traffic sent
from the Coordinator.
4.4.2 Experimental Setup II
The physical experimental setup was quite complicated. It included different
sensor devices and firmwares. Most of the results obtained were up to mark
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while some of them were deviated. Analysis are presented in detail below:
Scenario 1:
In the first experiment, network scanning attack was tested. Through
the KillerBee device, attempts were made to discover the PAN ids of the
Shimmer devices and channel being used by them in the network. The
KillerBee zbstumbler command was used for this purpose. The command
would send the beacon request and would expect for the reply. Had the
devices replied the beacon request, KillerBee device could identify PAN ids
and the channel numbers. But, the Shimmer devices did not respond to the
beacon request. This is because the Shimmer end devices could pair up with
just single device and precisely based on MAC address. They would only
respond to the network join command sent from Coordinator. However,
when the network traffics were monitored through the Goodfet device, it
showed that the broadcasted beacon request sent from the KillerBee device
with the respective channels used as shown in Figure 4.8. To ensure that the
highlighted traffics were beacon requests, embedded the Goodfet command
was modified to operate in packet dissection mode. This made it possible
to recognize the beacon requests. Figure 4.9 shows a dissected beacon
request with respective channel used. This alerts that ZigBee network can
be scanned and open the doorway for the attackers.
Scenario 2:
The real attack was tested in the second scenario. At first, the Goodfet
goodfet.ccspi surf command was used to sniff the network traffic flowing
on the network. It showed channel numbers along with traffic flowing on
them. The KillerBee zbdump command which is analogous to tcpdump [8]
was then executed to capture the traffic flowing in the channel 26 based
on the information provided by the Goodfet device. The packets captured
were then re-transmitted to the network in the same channel. However, to
identify the attack, a replay attack was made on channel 12 and monitored
from the Goodfet device as shown in Figure 4.12. ZigBee network has no
security provision for replay attack [8]. This security weakness of the ZigBee
network was taken into consideration to make the replay attack. Provided
that ZigBee network transfers the OTA (over-the-air) key used for either
encryption, decryption or joining the network over the air, KillerBee zbdsniff
command could be used to sniff the such network keys. Figure 4.13 depicts
a sample of captured OTA key flowing among the network traffic. The
experiment was conducted on a externally pre-captured file as the Shimmer
network under experiment would not transfer such keys over the air. It is
inconvenient to flash such keys in every sensor nodes if the network contains
thousands of sensor nodes. In such cases, the network keys might need to
transfer over the air. This opens another doorway for attackers. However,
in a small network concerning health system of a person, those keys can be
flash individually in the end devices.
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Scenario 3:
The selective DoS attack accomplished through extended replay attack
provided inkling that through insertion of voluminous traffic interference
can be created in the communication channels. Previously, it was found
that the data communication between Shimmer sensor nodes and Shimmer
Coordinator was taking place on channel 26. Therefore, KillerBee device
was set to re-transmit billions of packets at interval of one packet per 0.001
second. The result showed that for certain period of time though short,
such attack could consume the channel hugely, dominating data flow of the
Shimmer end sensors. Thus, it was known that the selective DoS attack can
easily be made once the channel used for data communication is figured out.
4.4.3 Decoding of 802.15.4 traffic
With use of bridging firmwares like the Goodfet and the PPPSniffer,
802.15.4 traffic could be decoded and dissected into human readable format.
Generally, sniffers present data in hexadecimal format. To be these
hexadecimal data human-readable, it needed to be decoded and dissected.
With additional Scapy-dot15d4 plugin, the Goodfet firmware could present
simple traffic dissection via terminal. It required some modifications in
embedded coding to dissect traffic flowing in all communication channels
for the Goodfet functionality. The PPPSniffer though took some time to
get properly configured, efficiently fed the data to Wireshark. Wireshark
has already been updated to support 802.15.4 traffic. The tool could decode
and dissect 802.15.4 traffic at ground level. It could even show almost every
information about the particular 802.15.4 frames and packets as shown in
Figure 2.3. Thus, the combination of the PPPSniffer configured Telosb




This chapter highlights about the findings of this thesis work, significance
of the findings and the experience and the knowledge gained. The chapter
also mentions about how this work is similar to the previous work and
how it differs from them on other hand. It provides briefing on how the
preliminary plans and procedures were altered and why they were necessary.
In addition, it enlightens about the limitation of the research work and the
factors governing such limitations. At the end, the chapter provides overview
on the possible extension for future students and scope for them in this field.
The chapter is organized based on results obtained, procedures and approach
followed, findings, scope and limitations, knowledge gained and future work.
In order to experiment the possibility of timely availability of data,
different DoS attacks were carried out. Experiments were repeated time
again to assure the reliability of the output. The results obtained from both
simulation and physical lab exposed that the timely availability of data can
be obstructed in the WBAN or ZigBee network. Such networks can be
attacked with different forms of DoS attacks. Three forms of DoS attack
were successfully experimented. In simulation work, jamming DoS attack
and misbehaving node DoS attacks were successfully carried out while in
physical lab selective jamming attack was accomplished. The study shows
that life-critical data in e-health system undertaking via the WBAN or
ZigBee network are susceptible to DoS attacks. In the physical lab, other
attacks were experimented. Sniffing and replay attack were successfully
tested. The WBAN or the ZigBee network can easily be scanned provided
that there is availability of specific hardware and firmwares. The PPPSniffer
and GoodFet open source firmwares can be flashed into the Telosb Tmote
Sky device and operate as 802.15.4 network sniffer. Data traffic flowing in
the network can be dissected into understandable format through packet
dissector. Wireshark and scapy dot15d4 plugins are available for dissecting
such traffics. It is ensured that ZigBee network has no security measure
against replay attack. With use of KillerBee firmware flashed into Atmel
AVR RAVEN RZUSBstick, replay attack is successfully carried out in the
lab network.
However, certain attack like network scanning with beacon request
broadcast cannot be accomplished in every 802.15.4 network as demon-
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strated by previous works. The network sensors answer to beacon request
only if they are configured to reply the beacon request of every devices in
the network. But, it does not make any sense from security point of view
to reply to any devices. The Shimmer sensor nodes in the physical lab
is configured to communicate only with the Coordinator. Responses from
the end sensors are dependent upon the MAC address of the Coordinator
configured on them. Hence, network scanning made from KillerBee device
cannot achieve successful result unless answering sensor devices are loosely
configured.
It has been more than a decade that the WBAN technology has
been developed. The survey conducted during research shows that the
security system developed for the implementation of this technology is
still in embryonic stage. Initially, the research was intended to conduct
on comparative analysis of available adaptive intrusion detection and
prevention systems for the WBAN security. Unfortunately, no such adaptive
intrusion detection and prevention system tools were coined out. However, it
has been a hot topic for research, and there has been a number of researches
accomplished. A number of models for such tools have been proposed but
very few such tools have been developed. The tools that have been developed
so far for wireless intrusion detection system comes with specific device. For
example, the CISCO has developed adaptive wireless intrusion detection
and prevention system for WLAN. But, the software is embedded with the
CISCO wireless devices. Hence, they are highly expensive. When it comes
to the WBAN, almost no intrusion detection tool is found. The security
system is mostly based on the WBAN applications themselves. However,
Snort and Kismet were considered as intrusion detection tools for the thesis
work. It is mentioned that with proper coding Snort could detect intrusions
in the wireless system. In addition, Snort has plugin named WireSHnork
for Wireshark. And Wireshark can dissect 802.15.4 traffic. Still as the
Snort rules are developed for IP network, it cannot be directly applied for
the WBAN. Therefore, it requires a emulator that can convert the WBAN
traffic into IP network traffic so that Snort rules can be applied. The task
might take longer time. Similarly, Kismet has developed a plugin named
dot15d4 that facilitates the task of dissecting 802.15.4 traffic for Kismet.
But, the plugin is still in rudimentary stage and can perform just simple
tasks like packet sniffing. These circumstances restricted the intended goal
of this thesis work. The work was thus confined within analysis of threats
and could not carry out intended tasks on available security system like
intrusion detection system.
Setting up proper experimental platform requires a bit more time. A
number of simulation tools do exist, but most of them are deployed for
finding out possible optimization of the network rather than security issues.
Further, as the WBAN is new technology, most of these simulators do
not have built in support for the WBAN. Those that support mostly
lack graphical interface and others are found using additional externally
developed models for the WBAN to carry on simulation work on it.
Therefore, they might be deployed for general network testing in the WBAN.
If non graphical tools are taken into consideration in order to create attack
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scenario, one has to understand background coding and has to extend them.
Thus, it might take longer time just to simulate attacks. For this reason, the
OMNeT++ and the OPNET modeler were considered for simulation work.
Both simulators can be run with free academic license. Initially, decision
was made to work in the OPNET modeler. Thus, the license was ordered
accordingly, but it would take 3-5 business days according to the OPNET
company. Therefore, simulation work was continued with the OMNeT++
simulator. It does not support the WBAN directly but a model named
MiXin can be implemented for the WBAN implementation. It is found that
it requires creation of attack scenarios through coding despite the graphical
support. Attempts were made to generate attacks but it was found time
consuming to accomplish all intended simulation work. The option was then
confined to the OPNET modeler. It took around 10 days to obtain license.
The modeler supports ZigBee network but with limited functionality. This
hindered to execute complete simulation work as planned. The simulator
does not provide complete support for wireless PAN directly. The OPNET
Wireless PAN model for Wireless PAN testing can be found for older version
of the OPNET modeler but not for the recent version. Thus, creating DoS
attacks through alteration of control messages of the WBAN protocol could
not be accomplished.
Initially, plan was made to work on just Shimmer devices, which
were previously present in the ASSET lab. The communication with
Shimmer Company support personnel had provided possible deployment
of the Shimmer devices to execute planned experiments. The modifications
on firmwares developed for other similar standard devices could possibly
be used. With time, it was known that Shimmer devices application could
easily be deployed to establish the WBAN standard network, but it was
hard to configure them as attacking nodes. Thus, the physical lab setup to
carry on intended experiments on the WBAN technology required different
additional sensor devices. These sensor devices are not easily available in
local market and thus were ordered from different countries. Likewise, the
firmwares to be configured in these devices are also rare. A number of
open source firmwares have been developed, but most of the firmwares are
device specific. Thus, it requires to have sound knowledge about compatible
hardware and firmwares. For absolute use of KillerBee device for different
attack scenarios, it requires special hardware and firmware to flash KillerBee
firmware in Atmel AVR RAVEN RZUSBstick. Such device is expensive.
Therefore, the device was sent to the developer of the KillerBee to flash it
with KillerBee firmware.
Most of the previous works are limited to security exploitation in the
WBAN. These works are generally carried on simulators probably due to
difficulty in obtaining the required hardware. The simulation work of the
research is not different from that of previous work. It could be taken
forward if other simulation tool that supported Wireless PAN simulation was
considered. Benchmarking the resource consumption like monitoring battery
consumption would provide evidence to make clear decisions. The OPNET
modeler does not provide platform for analyzing undergoing network traffic.
Unlike previous work, this thesis work has proved that network scanning
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with beacon request broadcast can generate no result unless the protocol
is loosely configured. Even default configuration of the recent WBAN
application nullifies the gain of network scanning with beacon request.
This work goes ahead of the previous work with physical lab experiments
where network traffic can be analyzed. No new firmwares are developed
for the experiments. However, modification on firmwares are made where
ever needed. Initially, the PPPSniffer could dissect package flowing on
only channel 11, but it was modified to dissect packets flowing on every
communication channels. Likewise, configuration of the Goodfet device in
TelosB device did not work straight forward as guided by the Goodfet
tutorial. It requires some modifications to configure properly and run
the commands. The thesis provides idea of how different hardware and
firmware can be grouped together to work as a complete package for the
WBAN implementation and conducting security experiments on them. For
this reason, the research provides a ground for switching the approach for
implementing the WBAN experiments on real devices for those who intend
to work on simulators.
Despite the thesis has been hindered by different problems, it has
produced different results. It has demonstrated different techniques that an
intruder might come up with to create obstructions in data communication
between sensor nodes. It is shown that techniques behind creation of
DoS attacks are not complex. But, the effects of such attacks may
matter significantly. In relation to health system, such hindrance in data
communication might be paid with patient lives. Similarly, the research
has demonstrated that 802.154.4 network can easily be sniffed. This alarms
for the prompt necessity of a system to prevent intruders from entering
into the network and sniff the packets. It also exhibits the possibility of
capturing and re-transmitting the packets into the network. The packet
re-transmission might cause severe result as well. For simple example,
a packet containing information about blood sugar level can be taken.
Suppose, the packet contains information stating that sugar level is normal,
and is transmitted over and again. The situation might be critical when
packet containing normal sugar level is transmitted when the sugar level
goes beyond threshold. Obviously, patient life is endangered. If the tests
are conducted in commercial applications, viability of replay attacks and
the possible effects might be brought out with proper evidence. The
result also bolsters that, if the network key is configured to send over the
air, it might be captured . This network key might be used to decrypt
the captured packets. Therefore, confidentiality of the data might be
breached. This thesis provides concept of different commonly used hardware
and firmwares, configuration issues and overview of their deployment for
different purposes. Hence, it assists people in saving their valuable time
in gathering knowledge about such devices and firmwares and their precise
implementation technique.
The experiments were conducted on Shimmer sensor network and specific
application was deployed for communication among the network nodes.
As most of the open source firmwares developed for sensor devices are
device specific, these firmwares are not compatible with Shimmer Device.
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This restricted flexibility of working with device and conduct variety of
experiments. The thesis work could have generated more convincing results
if the experiments were conducted in devices like Telosb Tmote Sky instead
of Shimmer devices. This is because Telosb devices can be configured
with different types of open source firmwares. It is comparatively easier
to alter the functionality of the device through modification on firmwares.
Thus, these devices can be made to work to fulfill different needs. Further,
it would have saved more time for experiments on physical lab if the
experiments on simulators were not thought of. Experiments conducted
and experimental results obtained are not different from the previous works.
However, simulation work assists in understanding functionality of the
WBAN technology. Thus, it contributes significantly in designing the lab
setup and predicting the results.
While conducting this research, some complexions were encountered due
to overlooking infrastructure setup complications. It was clear that the
implementation of the WBAN technology requires working with different
sensor devices. These devices are not commonly used, so it requires in-
depth survey in the very beginning. In contrary, most of the time was spent
on literature review. The literature review had warned about unavailability
of security tools and complications that might encounter during physical lab
set up. The lab devices were already present in the lab, so such warnings
were overlooked. Most of the previous works were based on simulation work,
therefore it could be inferred that simulation tools were easily available and
could easily be deployed. Ironically, obtaining the OPNET modeler was
time consuming and was found unable to get deployed as expected. The
simulation tools are quite sophisticated and thus it needs some time to
understand the functionality of the tools. Since, the simulation results are
not different from that of previous work, it would have been wise to utilize
the time spent on simulation work over physical lab work. In lab work, as
mentioned previously, it was thought to alter the firmware that was being
used on Shimmer nodes to make it operate as desired based on literature
review. Later it was found that the modification task is quite complicated
and thus suggested the need of other simple applications. But, there exists
very few open source ZigBee applications that could be used in Shimmer
nodes. Most ZigBee applications come with pre-installed on devices. Thus,
most of the experiments were limited to physical and data link layer of
802.15.4 network. It requires extensive preliminary survey while working
on new technology like the WBAN. The alternative approaches should be
planned in advance to bypass different hindrances that might be encountered
due to unavailability of firmwares and hardware.
The thesis provides quick knowledge about the WBAN technology, some
associated devices and their purpose and functionality. It delivers knowledge
about different platforms for playing with the WBAN implementation.
More importantly, it disseminates knowledge about findings and further
requirements in this field in terms of security system specifically in e-health
system. The work has shown that the WBAN technology is vulnerable to
different attacks. Ironically, the technology lacks efficient security system.
In fact, the security system developed till now are mostly confined as paper
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work only. Mostly, the models have been developed. The security tools,
which have been developed are found used only for the research purpose.
But, the security requirement in the WBAN application specially in the
field of e-health system is extremely important. Through the simulation
work and physical lab work, different types of attacks have been successfully
made. The previous works are mostly performed in simulators. The research
has shown that different attacks can also be generated in physical lab setup
with devices like the Telosb and the AVR RAVEN, and the firmwares like
the Goodfet and the KillerBee. For analysis, Scapy plugin dot15d4 can be
embedded with the Goodfet. Similar, the PPPSniffer can be configured to
feed the WBAN traffic to Wireshark. Using these hardware and software one
can easily setup own 802.15.4 network and continue exploring security issues.
Kismet has initiated developing plugin for 802.15.4 intrusion detection.
Since, the plugin is still in rudimentary stage, one think of enhancing the
plugin. One can work on developing a bridge between the WBAN and
the WLAN protocols so that the WBAN traffic can be emulated into data
traffic understandable by WLAN security system. As a result, with some
modification on tools like Snort and their intrusions detection rules, it might
detect intrusions in the WBAN. With use of firmwares like the PPPSniffer
and the WSbridge, certain sensor devices can feed the WBAN traffic to
Wireshark packet analyzer. Further, Snort plugin named WireSHnork has
been developed for Wireshark. This provides some motivation and hope
for using Snort as intrusion detection in the WBAN. One can think of
contributing with developing security system for the WBAN based on these
tools. This thesis is based on self configured devices. One of the interesting
future work can be testing the attacks discussed on this work and also other
forms of attacks on commercial ZigBee devices. However, as the devices
needed for experiments are not easily available, time constraint should be
considered if one thinks of starting from scratch, else, the work can be
further extended and effort can be made to develop a security tool for
the WBAN implementation. Security tools for the WBAN are rare but





This thesis has been conducted as the requirement for the completion
of Master’s Degree program in Network and System Administration at
University of Oslo. It has been carried on as a part of ASSET project. The
study has researched on security system that is currently available for the
WBAN implementation. The core focus was paid on ZigBee technology. The
overall task was carried out in two parts: Simulation work and real hardware
work. DoS attacks like Jamming Attack and Misbehaving Node Attack were
experimented successfully in simulator. Likewise, Selective Jamming DoS
Attack, Sniffing, Packet Capturing and Replay Attack were shown possible
through lab work.
It has been demonstrated that traditional network scanning tools like
KillerBee might not find out the identity of network elements in the
WBAN sensor network. However, KillerBee was an efficient firmware
available to create different types of attacks in 802.15.4 and ZigBee network.
Similarly, Goodfet and PPPSniffer (together with Wireshark) were equally
efficient tools to analyze the WBAN traffic. Telosb Tmote Sky was found
multipurpose device to carry on experiments on the WBAN security. Scapy
was fine tool to decode and dissect the WBAN traffic. The research could
not accomplish the overall intended tasks. No Intrusion Detection System
was found developed for the WBAN. The task carried on simulation work
could be accomplished in physical lab with some modification on firmwares
deployed for sensor nodes. It would have generate more convincing results
if the time utilized for simulation work was paid to lab work. The time
could be utilized to get familiarized with application code and modify them
accordingly to create more attacks for security analysis.
In addition to delivering knowledge about generating different attacks
on the WBAN deployment, this thesis contributes on setting up the WBAN
lab for experimenting security tests. The research points out the lack of
security system tools in realm of the WBAN technology deployment despite
its increasing demand. It can be extended forward with an attempt to
develop a tool that might mitigate above mentioned attacks. Kismet dot15d4
is an open source security tools for the WBAN which is under development.
The project can be carried on to develop a security system from such
rudimentary tool and make important contribution in theWBAN. The thesis
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was based on customized the WBAN devices. In future, experiments can
also performed on commercial the WBAN application to analyze the security
system present on commercial products. This will help understand and get
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